























ETHICS IN FINANCE, FINANCE IN ETHICS
NEW APPROACHES TO FINANCING AND SOLIDARITY
PAOLO GARONNA
FABRIZIO SPAOLONZI (eds.)
The relationship between ethics and ﬁnance has always been a controversial
and complex one. But there has been recently a turning point. In the world of
ﬁnance, there is a new awareness of the importance of the ethical dimension,
and a wave of initiatives to consolidate the ethical foundations of ﬁnancial
activity. In the world of ethics, in turn, attention is growing on the possible role
of ﬁnance for poverty reduction and the common good. The contributions we
have collected in this volume explore some of the changes underway in the
relationship between ethics and ﬁnance and provide evidence of this new and
more constructive interplay.
This volume collects essays by Robert Annibale (Citi Group), Davide Dal Maso
(Avanzi), Miguel Poiares Maduro (former Minister for Regional Development,
Portugal), Domingo Sugranyes Bickel (Centesimus Annus-Pro Pontiﬁce
Foundation) and Paolo Garonna (FeBAF and LUISS Guido Carli University).
Paolo Garonna is Secretary General of the Italian Banking Insurance and
Finance Federation (FeBAF) since October 2012, and professor of Political
Economy at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome.
Fabrizio Spaolonzi is marketing and sales consultant at Blue Financial
Communication and head of Communication for UNINFO. He previously





TO FINANCING AND SOLIDARITY
PAOLO GARONNA
FABRIZIO SPAOLONZI (ed.)
























ETHICS IN FINANCE, FINANCE IN ETHICS
NEW APPROACHES TO FINANCING AND SOLIDARITY
PAOLO GARONNA
FABRIZIO SPAOLONZI (eds.)
The relationship between ethics and ﬁnance has always been a controversial
and complex one. But there has been recently a turning point. In the world of
ﬁnance, there is a new awareness of the importance of the ethical dimension,
and a wave of initiatives to consolidate the ethical foundations of ﬁnancial
activity. In the world of ethics, in turn, attention is growing on the possible role
of ﬁnance for poverty reduction and the common good. The contributions we
have collected in this volume explore some of the changes underway in the
relationship between ethics and ﬁnance and provide evidence of this new and
more constructive interplay.
This volume collects essays by Robert Annibale (Citi Group), Davide Dal Maso
(Avanzi), Miguel Poiares Maduro (former Minister for Regional Development,
Portugal), Domingo Sugranyes Bickel (Centesimus Annus-Pro Pontiﬁce
Foundation) and Paolo Garonna (FeBAF and LUISS Guido Carli University).
Paolo Garonna is Secretary General of the Italian Banking Insurance and
Finance Federation (FeBAF) since October 2012, and professor of Political
Economy at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome.
Fabrizio Spaolonzi is marketing and sales consultant at Blue Financial
Communication and head of Communication for UNINFO. He previously





TO FINANCING AND SOLIDARITY
PAOLO GARONNA
FABRIZIO SPAOLONZI (eds.)
garonna_spaolonzi 15x 21:15x21  16-09-2016  16:46  Pagina 1
LUISS UnIverSIty PreSS

Paolo Garonna and Fabrizio Spaolonzi (eds.)
Ethics in finance, finance in ethics
New approaches to financing and solidarity
© 2016 LUISS University Press - Pola Srl
Proprietà letteraria riservata
ISBn 978-88-6856-071-3







Questo libro è stato composto in ITC Charter
e stampato presso Prontostampa
Via Praga 1, 24040 Verdellino Zingonia (BG)
Prima edizione settembre 2016
Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo
di periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall’art. 68, commi 4 e 5, della legge 22 apri-
le 1941 n. 633.
Le fotocopie effettuate per finalità di carattere professionale, economico o commerciale o comunque per uso
diverso da quello personale possono essere effettuate a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da CLEA-
Redi, Centro Licenze e Autorizzazioni per le Riproduzioni Editoriali, Corso di Porta Romana 108, 20122 Mi-
lano, e-mail autorizzazioni@celaredi.org e sito web www.clearedi.org
Table of Contents
Preface ...................................................................................p. 9
Ethics and finance in search of a new relationship
PaOLO GarOnna .......................................................................“ 13
1. A long history of mutual hostility ..................................“ 13
2. The exception of St. Ambrose ........................................“ 14
3. The “Monti di pietà”
and the solidaristic tradition of mutual lending .............“ 15
4. From the moral exception to the double standard..........“ 16
5. The dichotomy between ethics and ﬁnance....................“ 17
6. “And Forgive us of our Debts” ........................................“ 19
7. Insolvency and the ethics of debt...................................“ 21
8. Public deﬁcits: Victorian versus Keynesian ethics...........“ 22
9. Sustainable debts versus excessive debts .......................“ 24
10. The austerity controversy in Europe:
economic or moral? ......................................................“ 28
11. Beyond good and evil. The role of the State ...................“ 30
12. The new ethics of bail-ins ..............................................“ 32
13. A turning point: the Pontiﬁcate of Benedict XVI.............“ 34
14. The nexus linking knowledge and values.......................“ 37
15. The ethical foundation of ﬁnance ..................................“ 38
16. Ethics and social capital ................................................“ 40
17. Why banks are special: the treatment of insolvency .......“ 42
18. Banks as liquidity providersy.........................................“ 44
6 taBLe OF COntentS
19. The systemic impact of ﬁnancial activities .....................“ 46
20. Pervasive moral hazards................................................“ 48
21. Credit creation and leverage..........................................“ 49
22. Redistributive implications:
creditworthiness and meritocracy .................................“ 53
23. The social role of ﬁnance...............................................“ 55
24. Towards the ethical recapitalisation
of the ﬁnancial industry ................................................“ 57
25. The next stage in the relationship
between ethics and ﬁnance ...........................................“ 59
26. Leverage for good:
the new frontiers of social investment ...........................“ 59
27. The poison of gifts: limits of the gift economy ...............“ 62
28. In search of a third way
between private charity and public welfare ...................“ 64
References ....................................................................“ 66
Ethics in finance:
the experience of sustainable finance in Italy
DavIDe DaL maSO ......................................................................“ 71
Social innovation and impact investment:
redefining the social contract
mIGUeL POIareS maDUrO...........................................................“ 79
Internally-driven ethical reconstruction: is it happening?
rOBert a. annIBaLe ..................................................................“ 87
1. Beginning at the level of the corporation .......................“ 87
2. Meeting regulatory expectations
and external stakeholder engagement...........................“ 90
3. Responsible and inclusive ﬁnance .................................“ 92
4. Conclusion....................................................................“ 93
7Investing in sustainable finance
and social infrastructure – Public Private Partnerships
DOmInGO SUGranyeS BICKeL .....................................................“ 95
1. New social demands oﬀer great opportunities ...............“ 96
2. “Help the poor help themselves”....................................“ 97
3. A role for solidarity in business decisions.......................“ 98
4. Finance with a purpose .................................................“ 100
Micro- and Macro- approaches
to ethical recapitalization of the financial sector
PaOLO GarOnna ........................................................................“ 101
1. Introduction..................................................................“ 101
2. Conceptual foundations:
trust, uncertainty and solidarity ....................................“ 103
3. The prevailing uncertainty of the global risk scenario....“ 104
4. Financial development:
more solution than cause of the problem.......................“ 105
5. Build ethics from below:
lessons from the corporate sector ..................................“ 106
6. From Micro- to Macro- ethical reconstruction:
the question of proﬁtability ...........................................“ 107
7. Conclusion: towards a global strategy,
Micro- Macro- and Meso- ..............................................“ 109
8. Focus on ﬁnance for the poor ........................................“ 110
Appendix ......................................................................“ 112
References ....................................................................“ 113
List of authors .........................................................................“ 115

Preface*
Ethics and ﬁnance have always been at loggerheads with each other. Sin-
ce the beginning of history. But there has been recently a turning point.
A promising new process of mutual cross-fertilisation appears underway.
In the world of ﬁnance, there is a new awareness of the importance
of the ethical dimension, and a wave of initiatives to consolidate the ethi-
cal foundations of ﬁnancial activity. In the world of ethics, in turn, attention
is growing on the possible role of ﬁnance for poverty reduction and the
common good.
The contributions we have collected in this volume explore some of
the changes underway in the relationship between ethics and ﬁnance and
provide evidence of this new and more constructive interplay.
People’s new awareness, raised by social and environmental crises,
generates effects in several directions: citizens-voters push their re-
presentatives in the political arena to pass more stringent regulations
– that, in turn, penalize (or reward) corporates’ social or environ-
mental policies; citizens-consumers use their purchasing power (the
so-called ‘vote with the wallet’) and determine the success of com-
panies’ business strategies; citizens-employees transfer their values
in the organisations they work for, promoting the change from the
inside. Like a tide, the new social sensitivity instils the seeds of chan-
ge at any level.
(Davide Dal Maso, Ethics in finance: the experience of sustainable
finance in Italy in this volume).
* The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not
necessarily represent the views of the respective organisations.
The ﬁnancial sector is at the forefront of this tide of rising social sensi-
tivity. Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI), the integration of
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors in investment stra-
tegies, are just one example of a shifting paradigm involving the social
contract and globalisation. Globalisation, as described in this publication,
is perceived as performing a critical function of “redistributing wealth bet-
ween diﬀerent set of actors” (Miguel Poiares Maduro, Social innovation and
impact investment: redeﬁning the social contract). In a context where the
mobility for capital has become easier, in particular in Europe where an
ambitious programme has been launched of Capital Markets Union, many
activities in the economy and society have become more closely inter-
connected. Not only businesses, but also individuals, households, trade,
technology. Also the “technological revolution” is having a signiﬁcant and
relevant redistributive impact, because the nature of the new products
and services that it creates is such that value added is often very stron-
gly concentrated.
In this challenging global scenario, the main role of ﬁnance in chan-
nelling capital into the real economy and supporting sustainable growth
over the medium to long term acquires greater meaning and signiﬁcan-
ce. And, in assessing investment opportunities, it becomes correspondingly
more essential to consider a broader range of parameters beyond stric-
tly ﬁnancial ones.
This is the reason why a culture of ethics (see Robert Annibale, In-
ternally-driven ethical reconstruction: is it happening?) for ﬁnancial in-
stitution is needed, and has to be developed and fully implemented. Fi-
nancial institutions play a critical role in society and should be commit-
ted to investing in urban infrastructure and economic progress respon-
ding to growing people’s needs in ﬁelds as diﬀerent as housing, social ser-
vices, energy, economic empowerment, ﬁnancial inclusion and physical
and intangible infrastructure.
Investors, as written in this book, are facing new challenges and de-
cide asset allocation not only considering the stability and proﬁtability
of investees, but also a broader set of dimensions, measured often through
a “set of indicators” (see Dal Maso) that assess the relationship between
management and its key stakeholders, such as shareholders, employe-
es, customers, communities, suppliers, the media, etc.
FeBAF, the Italian Banking Insurance and Finance Federation, is com-
mitted to promoting this new vision. In playing its role as a cross-secto-
ral think tank, capable of bringing together the Weltanschauung and the
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long-term interests of banks, insurers, asset managers and pension funds,
Febaf has placed ethics on the top of its priorities agenda. It engages its
associates, national, European and international partners in discussing
possible environmental and social consequences of ﬁnancial sector’s de-
velopments and strategies. It strives for measures that are key to the crea-
tion of a healthier ﬁnancial environment and a more stable and prospe-
rous economy in the long run.
As a concrete manifestation of its commitment, FeBAF, together with
the main Italian representatives of the banking, insurance and ﬁnancial
sector – i.e. the Italian Sustainable Investment Forum, ABI, ANIA and AS-
SOGESTIONI – promoted the signature of the “Charter of Sustainable and
Responsible Investment for the Italian Finance”. The Charter has highlighted
the relevance and the high value that the principles of ethics, sustaina-
bility and long term orientation have for the industry. The aim of this “pled-
ge” or agreement is to contribute to a more eﬃcient capital allocation,
the achievement of long-term investment objectives, the satisfactory re-
sponse to citizens’ demands and the requirements of medium-long term
savings.
In order to succeed in satisfying this new demands, entrepreneurial
initiative needs a favourable institutional context in terms of jobs ac-
cessibility, education systems, and ﬁscal-friendly policies to attract in-
vestment, stabilise existing ones, and make it possible for innovation and
start-ups to grow up and ﬂourish. Beside that, spreading the risk cultu-
re and promoting the debate on sustainability and social responsibility
amongst the members of the ﬁnancial and business community is key to
maintaining high quality standards for society and individuals.
The private sector, and the partnership between private and public
players, play a fundamental role in this challenge. In fact, as underlined
in this book, experience shows that
Relying on centralized and impersonal public programs does not bring
sustainable solutions on either front: qualitative change cannot be
achieved through regulation alone; and the old assistance systems
can induce a dangerous “welfare trap” based on passivity and inac-
tion which aggravates poverty. Decentralized entrepreneurial ini-
tiative is the only context where the new demands can be satisfied.
(Domingo Sugranyes Bickel, Investing in sustainable finance and
social infrastructure – Public Private Partnerships).
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To sum up, ﬁnance is today called upon to respond to growing disequi-
libria uncertainty and instability by identifying measuring and managing
risk. This necessitates a particular attention to enhancing knowledge and
leadership. And invest in their development. Projects like ﬁnancial edu-
cation, ﬁnancial inclusion and the dissemination of a risk culture have
to be carried out and brought to fruition, not only by global players but
also from ordinary citizens and private business. It is in this play-
ground that corporate social responsibility, responsible investment, su-
stainable insurance and social impact investment become new tools for
an increasingly competitive market.
Competition has stimulated the dissemination of best practise and
pushed operators towards investing more and better in business ethics.
Branding has come into play as a tool for strengthening the image
of social responsibility and the corporate identity of the firm as a ca-
ring institution.
(Paolo Garonna, Micro- and Macro- approaches to ethical recapi-
talization of the financial sector).
While we are still far from a systematisation of the new approaches,
time is ripe for bringing together insights coming from diﬀerent per-
spectives and walks of life, developing agreed frameworks for action, and
identifying best practise. This is the task of the present publication.
In producing it, we hope we can provide a modest but useful contri-
bution to delivering a global and comprehensive strategy for better ethics
and for better ﬁnance, capable of gaining the trust of the public and sti-
mulating partnership among the numerous and diﬀerent players at sta-
ke.
We owe it to the professionals working hard in the diﬀerent sectors
of ﬁnance. We owe it to the regulators and policy makers facing up to the
challenges of a demanding agenda. We owe it to savers and citizens that
have to make ends meet in a tight and tense context. Above all we owe
it to future generations.
Paolo Garonna and Fabrizio Spaolonzi
Rome, august 2016
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Ethics and ﬁnance in search of a new relationship
PaOLO GarOnna*
1. a LOnG hIStOry OF mUtUaL hOStILIty
The relationship between ethics and ﬁnance has always been a contro-
versial and complex one. The origin of such complexity can be traced back
to the beginning of history. For millennia, ﬁnanciers have been derided,
condemned, framed, jailed, and often butchered. Money lending, and mo-
ney borrowing, appeared to possess an inherently “unnatural” and
threatening character that put it in contrast with humanity and social or-
der.
Probably it is the concept of money itself that in a gift dominated eco-
nomy, and society, generated suspicion and mistrust, as it challenged the
conventional sources of authority and public trust (Aristotle). Credit de-
bit and ﬁnance predated money and money-denominated assets (Grae-
ber), and were fully integrated ab initio in the social order of the various
communities. But when they became part of monetary exchanges, mar-
kets and trade, they became emblematic of the serious threat posed to
sharing, reciprocity, charity, power and culture in human relationships
that the new mechanisms implied. The moral challenge then became acu-
te and striking. From the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1760 BC) onwards,
the role of money in society was regulated, formalised and recognised
as a necessity, but at the same time, money lending came to be considered
immoral and shameful. Lending charging an interest to its beneﬁciary,
called “usury”, was condemned, forbidden, sanctioned and punished in
various ways. We ﬁnd this in most religions of the past, from Vedic texts
in India to Buddhism and Islam.
* FeBAF Secretary General and Professor of Political Economy at the LUISS Gui-
do Carli University in Rome.
14 ethICS anD FInanCe In SearCh OF a new reLatIOnShIP
2. the exCePtIOn OF St. amBrOSe
In Christianity, a fundamental development took place in the early Mid-
dle Ages that was attributed to the responsibility of St. Ambrose, the Bi-
shop of Milan (4th century AD), in his famous book De Tobia. Based on
an interpretation of the Old Testament, a practise was introduced, and
formally incorporated in the Corpus Juris Canonici, which would permit
interest to be collected in money-lending. “Unto thy brother thou shalt
not lend upon usury; but unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury”
(Deuteronomy 23:20). In other terms, lending at interest was permitted
if done by Jews in relation to Gentiles, and vice versa. Therefore, the Jews,
who had been barred from most professions and from the ownership of
land, could legally practise, and specialise, on money lending. Christians
and Jews were not morally allowed to lend for money within their own
separate communities, as that would be against brotherly relationships.
Nevertheless, based on the Biblical predicament, they were legally per-
mitted to trade credit between each other. That practise was often not
only tolerated, but actively encouraged, and even placed under papal pro-
tection in Medieval Italy. In this way, the expansion of credit, which re-
sponded to the growing need and demand for loans required by inve-
stment, payments, and naturally wars, became legally possible, and mo-
rally tolerable. It was simply the outcome of a “moral exception”, and re-
mained therefore consistent with a persisting ethical stigma on ﬁnance.
Only much later, in the high Middle Ages and the Renaissance, un-
der the inﬂuence of the liberal Popes of the time, often linked to the pro-
sperous and burgeoning Italian republics (.e.g. the Medicis in Florence),
moral attitudes evolved signiﬁcantly. Credit and banking was in the me-
antime growing fast and supported the expansion of trade, the new ex-
plorations and discoveries, the building of modern infrastructures and
the magniﬁcent works of art of the time. The concept of “interesse” (from
the Latin “intereo”, meaning compensation from loss) replaced then that
of “usury”, suggesting that some form of compensation was legitimate
as a kind of repayment for the “losses and damages” that the lender had
incurred. Money was not “barren and unproductive” (as in Aristotle), but
an essential resource that enabled the creation of prosperity and wellbeing.
3. the “mOntI DI PIetà”
anD the SOLIDarIStIC traDItIOn OF mUtUaL LenDInG
With the development of agriculture and farming, particularly in Lom-
bardy, the possibility of farmers to lend to one another as a form of mu-
tual help further contributed to build a positive ethics for banking and
insurance. “Mounts of piety”, called “Lombards” from where they origi-
nated, spread all over Europe, and even to-day we ﬁnd in most Europe-
an cities “Lombard Streets”, named after the pawnshops that once resi-
ded there. Christian and cooperative lending took root, buttressed also
by a strong altruistic motivation, particularly under the impulse of the
Franciscans, but was still ﬁercely opposed and morally controversial (think
of the doctrinal dispute with the Dominicans).
In the Enlightenment, as the European economy continued to grow
culminating with the industrial revolution, and banking houses were esta-
blished to provide credit to a wide array of economic endeavours, the eco-
nomic understanding of the important productive role of ﬁnance conti-
nued to improve. But the perception of the morality of lending at inte-
rest did not change fundamentally. Enlightenment intellectuals predicated
the morality of altruism and self-sacriﬁce. Usury instead continued to be
perceived as a form, perhaps the naked and purest example, of the self-
interested blind unfettered pursuit of proﬁt. Therefore morally contem-
ptible and deplorable.
Bentham, and then above all Adam Smith, turned the latter argument,
or better the economic rationale of that argument, upside down. Self-in-
terest through the so called “invisible hand” was in their perspective to
be seen as a way to increase “social utility”. Contractual freedom and the
market mechanism could therefore play a useful role also in the ﬁeld of
banking and ﬁnance. Bentham in his pamphlet “A defence of usury” even
tried to propose a moral justiﬁcation of credit and lending, based on the
notion that innovative trades needed to raise capital, which inherently
involved high risk that only the free interplay between borrowers and len-
ders could assess and manage. But these intuitions remained by-and-
large at the stage of theoretical breakthroughs. In practise, Smith’s un-
derstanding of the operation of credit markets and of the value of mo-
ney lending made him extremely cautious in his ethical approach to ban-
king. To avoid excesses, abuses and instability, and ensure that individual
freedoms actually deliver society’s welfare, Smith – and Bentham with
him – thought that it was necessary to foresee strong limits and controls
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on market players. Utilitarian moral reasoning was highly dependent on
the prevailing moral perception of the state of the world, and that per-
ception still considered lending at interest a very dubious practise. Any
utilitarian defence of usury therefore ended up logically implying a per-
vasive Government intervention, limits and constraints, heavy regulation,
on a sector considered morally decrepit.
4. FrOm the mOraL exCePtIOn tO the DOUBLe StanDarD
Following Bentham and Smith, the liberal “Classical” economists of the
19th century (Ricardo, Say and Stuart Mill) and later the Austrian scho-
ol (Boehm-Bawerk, Menger and von Mises) theorised the importance of
lending markets and the social role of freely contracted interest rates, gai-
ning a signiﬁcant understanding of what was happening in practise. An
extraordinary expansion of credit in fact was fuelling the industrial re-
volution, international trade, the building of infrastructure, the coloni-
sation of the new world, technological development, wide access to home
ownership, etc.
It is in this context that the distinction between “interest” and “usu-
ry” widened, crystallised and permitted the creation of a kind of double
standard. Credit operations were split into two allegedly diﬀerent con-
cepts: the charging of “interest” and the practise of “usury”, leaving it to
the public powers to deﬁne and regulate such diﬀerence. In this way a
dichotomy was established between the reality of markets and trade and
the ideal conﬁguration of social relationships. This dichotomy managed
to maintain the moral stigma associated to lending and at the same time
permitted the practical demands of funding and commerce to be satisﬁed.
In one sentence, the dichotomy between the world of ethics and that of
ﬁnance became established and functional.
In this conceptual framework, regulation took on a social, and ethi-
cal, role that went well beyond the need to remedy market imperfections.
It performed the critical task of separating what is morally acceptable,
and permitted, from what is evil, and condemnable. Obviously, the de-
marcation lines between the two concepts (usury and credit) have re-
mained fuzzy and often arbitrary, subject to public moods and political
manipulation. Keynes felt deeply, and expressed in strong wording, this
ethical contradiction we are forced – in his view – to live with, due to the
practical requirements of capital accumulation. Thrift, self-interest and
precaution are to be considered “moral vices” or – using Keynes’ wording
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– “the most distasteful of human qualities” that however are an “econo-
mic necessity” of the present stage of capitalist development. Let us look
at the full quote that I ﬁnd illuminating of the moral approach of some
of the best analysts of modern monetary and credit markets:
When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social im-
portance, there will be great changes in the code of morals. We shall
be able to rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which
have hag-ridden us for two hundred years, by which we have exal-
ted some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the position
of the highest virtues. (…) But beware! The time for all this is not
yet. For at least another hundred years, we must pretend to oursel-
ves and to everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is use-
ful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our
gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tun-
nel of economic necessity into daylight.
5. the DIChOtOmy Between ethICS anD FInanCe
Keynes’ predictions, like those of Karl Marx, did not materialise. In the
capitalism of the 21st century, credit and ﬁnance have not become less
important, nor “less useful”. Rather, as we will see later, they are being
increasingly perceived as “morally” necessary to build an economy, and
a society, more oriented towards the common good. However, this quo-
te shows the widely held ethical dilemma that separates what is neces-
sary from what is good, and the commonly accepted view, dating far back
in history, that ﬁnance is a “necessary evil” we have to come to terms with.
It also shows the supposedly moralising role of regulators and policy-
makers vis-à-vis ﬁnance: what is not regulated supervised controlled, etc.
is ipso facto abusive, shadowy, immoral. “Shadow banking” for instance
is a good case in point. Punitive regulation and usury laws restricting the
rates of interest or constraining other commercial banks’ practises have
remained in most legislation until recently, and for certain aspects un-
til to-day. In the US for instance State ceilings on interest rates and other
norms that fragmented the operation of nation-wide banking and capi-
tal markets were wiped out only through the “big bang” of the 1970’s and
the 1980’s. But the dichotomy between ethics and ﬁnance, which – as we
have seen – had gradually replaced the “moral exception” of the high Mid-
dle Ages, has remained alive and kicking, deeply entrenched in the un-
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derlying philosophy and the “material constitution” of modern-day ﬁ-
nancial markets and institutions.
This dichotomy has a profound inﬂuence on the public opinion and
the political debate. It aﬀects the reputation and the credibility of mar-
ket players and institutions. It suﬃces to mention the frequent attacks in
political campaigns and in the press against the reckless immorality of ban-
kers, and of European institutions protecting them (the “Europe of ban-
kers”). Actually, for unscrupulous politicians in search of easy populari-
ty attacking banks and bankers has always been an infallible expedient.
Bankers are easy scapegoats of crises and economic misfortunes. The pen-
dulum of regulation and over-regulation cycles reﬂects this moral di-
chotomy, more than the cycles of instability and business expectations.
The segregation of ﬁnance from ethics may have also had some spu-
rious beneﬁts for bankers… if I may use some irony! Left with few ethi-
cal guideposts, in a limbo of bad reputation and unscrupulousness, the
ﬁnancial sector has been an easy target to inﬁltrate for crooks and villains
of diﬀerent kinds. “Condemned to be rich…” said Ferdinand Braudel of
the segregated money lenders of the Middle Ages. “Condemned to be im-
moral…” we might say of the ﬁnanciers of modern times. In turn, it is un-
deniable that misﬁts and malpractices, and correspondingly the various
scandals that have plagued the world of ﬁnance, have greatly reinforced
the segregation of ﬁnance from ethics, and increased the distance bet-
ween the twos. However, the real and primary victim of this dichotomy
is the ﬁnancial sector itself and all its stakeholders, starting from the sa-
vers, the investors and the ordinary citizens that rely on it. Overburde-
ned by stiﬂing regulation and ever tighter supervision, sometimes over-
taxed, exposed to shifts of conﬁdence and volatility of expectations, fa-
ced with increasing demands and risks, banks ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃ-
cult to-day to cater satisfactorily for the needs of their clients and sha-
reholders. At the same time, they have to remain proﬁtable, compete in
cross-border and cross sectoral markets, invest in technology and human
capital, engage in sustainability and the future. I am convinced that brid-
ging the gap between ethics and ﬁnance would serve above all the inte-
rests of the weaker segments of the economy and society, the young, the
excluded, those without money and power, those vulnerable people who
need funding most and pose also most risks to lenders.
Lending at “interest” came to designate lower premium, lower risk
(…) lending, while “usury” came to mean specifically higher pre-
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mium, higher risk (…) lending. This artificial division enabled the
wealthier, more powerful, more influential people to freely engage
in money lending with the one hand, while continuing to condemn
the practise with the other. Loans made to lower risk, higher inco-
me borrowers would be treated as morally acceptable, while those
made to higher risk, lower income borrowers would remain morally
contemptible.
(Yaron Brook, The Morality of Money Lending: a Short History).
6. “anD FOrGIve US OF OUr DeBtS”
The ethics of lending corresponds closely to that of borrowing. If lending
has always been considered dodgy from the moral point of view, borro-
wing has also been tainted with ethical reproach and stigma. It is well
known that in German the word for “debt” (Schuld) is the same as for
“guilt”. To get into debt one must have done something ethically wrong.
But the equation “debt equals sin” is etymologically common to many lan-
guages, including Greek and Hebrew. In the Lord’s Prayer this equation
is evoked, even though the emphasis there is not on punishment, but in-
stead on forgiveness:
And Forgive us of our Debts as we also have Forgiven our Debtors
The Gospel’s prayer represents a vivid and authoritative reminder of two
important aspects of the ethics of debt. 1. The debt contract is considered
fundamental, and has been considered as such, in all communities and cul-
tures, and therefore if there is no repayment of debt and that contract is bro-
ken, the social order is negatively aﬀected (the concept of debt as sin and
guilt); 2. The treatment of people who have become insolvent is central in
an ethical approach to debt (Forgiveness). On this second aspect, in the pas-
sage from Classical Antiquity to Christianity there was a signiﬁcant evolution
and a break with the cruel and pitiless practises of the old time. Debt sla-
very, bondage, corporal punishment and debtors’ prison, against which al-
ready Solon in the Athenian democracy had protested, have remained in
use for a long time, even until late in the 19th century, and beyond. The Ro-
man Law notion “fallitus ergo fraudator” (all insolvents are swindlers) im-
plied dealing with the debtor in harsh, often inhuman terms. Debtors’ pri-
son were not only a deterrent and a punishment, but were intended also
to force debtors (considered fraudsters) to reveal possibly hidden sources.
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A more human, and Christian, approach predicated instead debt for-
giveness, on a regular basis, as in the Jubilees of the Biblical tradition.
We should give insolvent debtors another chance. We should consider the
need of safeguarding the positive outcomes of what failed entrepreneurs
have achieved, learning from failures and mistakes. The two diﬀerent mo-
ral approaches clashed and co-existed for centuries, and may be seen at
play even now in the tensions and debates on bankruptcy reforms.
Bankruptcy systems in fact have been gradually emerging starting from
the period of the prosperous Italian Medieval republics (the etymology
comes from the Italian “banca rotta”, broken bench). The emergence and
spread of joint stock companies, and the growing awareness of business
cycles and macroeconomic instability depersonalised the reasons for in-
solvency, leaving fraud as only one among many possible situations of in-
solvency. Later the recognition of the disruptive nature of innovation and
technological change, and the role of “creative destruction” (Schumpe-
ter) in the economics of competition and development further contributed
to a fundamental change in the approach to failure and debt.
Finance also contributed to this change of perspective. The modern
approach to credit, and debit, establishes a link between risk and yield,
risk management and proﬁtability. Therefore, the repayment of a debt
should be seen not as a moral (and absolute) obligation, but as a risk-wei-
ghted outcome to be assessed in an asset management framework. In-
creasingly bankruptcies were seen as an economic rather than a moral
failure.
The nineteen century was according to Mann (2002) characterised
by a “redefinition of insolvency from sin to risk, from moral failu-
re to economic failure.
(Gratzer and Stiefel 2008, p. 8).
Bankruptcy systems were the outcome of a gradual “moral revolution”
or evolution that has fundamentally changed how we deal with debtors
and insolvencies. They are nowadays an integral part of the legislative
framework required for a well-functioning market economy. Without dea-
ling eﬀectively, and fairly, with insolvencies, in fact, there would be se-
rious obstacles to innovation, competition and economic development.
The market economy requires “enterprise demography”, i.e. the entrance
of new ﬁrms and the liquidation of the unsound unviable ones. Without
such a system, the economic dynamics would be impaired and there would
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be no way to ascertain what is viable from what it is not, what works or
does not work. Ultimately, it is the market that “decides” on success and
failure, but that decision requires smooth mechanisms for managing in-
ﬂows and outﬂows.
The main purpose of insolvency regimes is three-fold. First, to esta-
blish equal conditions among creditors in their execution claims. Second,
to make arrangements ensuring the continued existence of viable pro-
duction units in crisis. Third, to ﬁnd acceptable compromises between the
contradictory motives and goals of creditors and debtors. Traditionally le-
gislation has assumed a signiﬁcant creditor-bias, reﬂecting the old ethics
of insolvency, and focusing mainly on executive procedures and creditors’
equality. This view has long been predominant in Europe. More recently,
particularly in relation to the attempt at creating a harmonised insolvency
framework in the EU, the model of the American Bankruptcy Code has at-
tracted attention with its pro-debtor bias. This model increases the in-
centives of debtors to return with a “fresh start” after bankruptcy, and crea-
tes positive spillover eﬀects on tax receipts, employment and regional in-
dustries. It appears more in line with the new ethics of insolvency. However,
the creditors’ reasons cannot be ignored. “Moral hazard” implications and
the risk of “convenience bankruptcies” that undermine the unprivileged
claims of subcontractors or taxpayers must be dealt with. This is the case
of the so-called “strategic bankruptcies” under Chapter 11 in the US.
7. InSOLvenCy anD the ethICS OF DeBt
From the side of borrowing, as we have seen, the ethical focus has shif-
ted from debt to insolvency, i.e. to the repayment of debt. Once incurred,
debts will have to be paid. Ethical considerations stimulated the emer-
gence and progress of insolvency legal frameworks that regulate the re-
payment of debt. They are based on the rule of law and a set of princi-
ples and measures that strike a delicate balance between conﬂicting in-
terests and preoccupations: those of the debtors and of the creditors, de-
terrence and rehabilitation, moral hazard and forgiveness etc.
But how about debt itself? Is it always and necessarily a “sin”? We
might repeat here the considerations mentioned above in relation to cre-
dit and moneylending, since the two phenomena are simply the two si-
des of the same coin. But it is remarkable that while attention on the mo-
rality of credit and the provision of credit has always been considerable,
relatively little we ﬁnd on the ethics of debt and on the side of liabilities.
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The rich rules over the poor. And the borrower becomes the lender’s
slave.
(Proverbs 22:7).
Owe nothing to anyone except to love one another; for he who loves
his neighbour has fulfilled the law.
(Romans 13:8).
On a cursory view, we may ﬁnd here at play the same dichotomy that cha-
racterized the ethics of lending, which is not surprising since the two are
specular phenomena. Debt is a necessity of life. It is useful from the eco-
nomic and social point of view. Debt is needed to invest in a long-term
perspective, to face up to shortfalls of income and wealth, to weather the
diﬃculties of life, to support aggregate demand and economic growth
(Keynes). But… by-and-large “it is not a good thing”. It reﬂects lack of
foresight and prudent management, it creates dependency, it encoura-
ges short-termism and adventurism (“in the long run we are all dead” Key-
nes), it shows a low sense of responsibility, it runs against prudent risk-
taking and thrift, etc. In other terms, as it was the case for lending, debt
is a “necessary evil”. It lives, and prospers, outside the realm of ethics,
in a moral limbo ruled by economic and practical mundane preoccupa-
tions. The world of debt, as that of ﬁnance, is not on speaking terms with
the world of ethics. The two cohabitate, but cannot be ethically married.
As with the twin concepts of “interest” and “usury”, also on the lia-
bility side, a distinction was introduced with practical preoccupations but
also ethical underpinnings: the distinction between “sustainable debt”
and “excessive debt”. But the dividing line between the twos was left ra-
ther ambiguous and arbitrary.
8. PUBLIC DeFICItS: vICtOrIan verSUS KeyneSIan ethICS
Economic analysis has tried to ﬁll the moral vacuum of debt and deﬁcit
problems. The main author that comes to mind is Nobel prize winner Ja-
mes Buchanan, the founder of public choice and constitutional econo-
mics that aim at describing public policies devoid of all normative cha-
racters, wert-frei (value-free), or in Buchanan’s terms “politics without
romance”. In his seminal paper on “The Ethics of Debt Default (1987)”,
Buchanan reaches the conclusion that “a collective decision to repudia-
te the debt need not, in itself, pull down the whole legal-political house
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of cards”. Coming from a positivist and a contractarian individualist, such
statements appear clearly predictable. However, Buchanan continues
“especially if it is accompanied by a change in the rules designed to in-
sure against recurrence of the necessity for repudiation”. This latter sta-
tement hints at the suggestive moral insights and implications underlying
Buchanan’s use of the theoretical toolbox of positive economics. His work
can be interpreted (see for instance Alvey 2011) as addressed at showing
why the Victorian ethical norms opposing public deﬁcits had collapsed
under the attack of Keynesian economics, and advocating in their place
new legislation, in particular a constitutional norm on balanced budgets.
The public choice framework plaid an essential role in Buchanan’s cri-
tique of Keynes. It showed in fact how, inevitably, relaxing the ethics of
ﬁscal discipline, as Keynes did in his plea for anti-cyclical deﬁcit spending,
had led to growing debts and deﬁcits. Democratic politicians are in fact
inherently biased towards public deﬁcits, the “ﬁscal illusion” leads peo-
ple to prefer debt to taxation, and future rather than current taxpayers
end up bearing the burden of today’s public debt. Debt is “equivalent to
‘eating up’ of capital”. It has a negative eﬀect on capital accumulation and
on the net wealth of society. The Keynesian “moral” revolution – in his
view – by undermining the ethics of responsible politics (the Victorian
age stigma of public debt) had created a breach in the social capital of
the nation, and consequently a permanent loss of productive potential.
This needed to be remedied by a kind of “moral counter-revolution”. In
his approach, this amounted to point out as a solution to the need to in-
troduce constitutional norms, rather than social norms. Such norms would
play an ethical role, constraining the free mechanisms of democratic po-
litics and containing the risks of populism.
“The Victorians had it right” he added, referring to what he called the
“Victorian ﬁscal religion”. It is “grossly immoral to ﬁnance current public
outlays on consumption, including transfer payments, by an issue of debt”.
It is also immoral for one generation to burden another for its own be-
neﬁt.
It is almost impossible to construct a contractual calculus, in which
representatives of separate generations would agree to allow ma-
jorities in a single generation to finance currently enjoyed public con-
sumption through the issue of public debt that insures (…) utility
losses on later generations of taxpayers.
(ibidem).
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Public-debt ﬁnancing also runs against the American Constitutional prin-
ciple of “no taxation without representation”, because future generations
do not vote.
It is somewhat paradoxical that Buchanan, the champion of positi-
ve, value-free economics attributes such an importance to ethical issues,
and does so drawing basically on his purely rational, engineering and po-
sitivistic framework. His criticism of the current state of economic ana-
lysis appears therefore particularly credible and biting:
Economists have almost totally neglected moral or ethical ele-
ments of the behaviour that has generated the observed modern re-
gime of continuing and accelerating budget deficits. To the extent that
moral principles affect choice constraints, such neglect is inexcusa-
ble.
(J. Buchanan, 1985, 1).
9. SUStaInaBLe DeBtS verSUS exCeSSIve DeBtS
In the last two decades, the question of sovereign debt has become ob-
ject of a heated policy debate. Recurrent sovereign defaults and ﬁnan-
cial crises have occurred in this period determining severe spillover eﬀects
on the global economy. That is why the issue has attracted a growing at-
tention at the international level, particularly at the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions. But Governments have approached it generally with reticen-
ce and embarrassment, for the obvious repercussions that this question
has on the concept itself of sovereignty and its prerogatives.
There have been various attempts at discussing and establishing com-
monly agreed principles, or even rules of the game, on sovereign debt re-
structuring, particularly at the IMF. These principles would be highly be-
neﬁcial to anchor market expectations and provide forward guidance on
policy behaviour. But these attempts have not been so far very successful,
due to the clear preference of the leading countries to deal with sovereign
crises ex-post-factum, on a case-by-case and ad-hoc basis. Political and
power relationships become then the decisive factor. Such an approach
looks fully in line with the dichotomy we have been talking about in this
essay. Sovereign debts and deﬁcits belong to the realm of politics, not ethics
– it is alleged. It is then up to a political decision and an intergovernmental
agreement to determine when and how to rescue a government in ﬁnancial
distress, and under what terms of conditionality.
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Thus, Mexico, Argentina, Russia and South East Asia were all con-
sidered special and diﬀerent cases, and were dealt with diﬀerently. Ob-
viously, this approach has created diﬃdence and suspicion. It has pushed
several countries (e.g. China) to accumulate on a precautionary basis a
huge – and distortionary – amount of international reserves. And it has
sometimes fed international controversies. The IMF for instance was cri-
ticised in the early 2010’s for its treatment of the Greek crisis and the la-
titude it applied – under the pressure of European Governments – in the
evaluation of the sustainability of the Greek public debt.
Economic analysis, notably at the IMF and in other international ﬁ-
nancial institutions, has tried to build frameworks that could lead to the
deﬁnition of objective standards in public ﬁnance, orientating market re-
actions and promoting good ﬁscal performance. The papers by Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ is a good case in point, not only for the interesting analytical
insights it provided, but also for the reactions and comments it provoked.
First, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ published a book in 2009 with an evocative
title: This time is diﬀerent. Eight centuries of ﬁnancial folly. In a fascina-
ting panoramic analysis of the history of ﬁnancial crises, they aimed at
showing that the “this time is diﬀerent” syndrome is ill founded. Serial
default represent a nearly universal phenomenon, a “rite of passage
through history”, as countries struggle to evolve from emerging markets
to advanced economies. Creditors, investors and governments have a ten-
dency not to learn from their past mistakes and indulge into an illusion
that each case and time is diﬀerent from the other, and therefore
should be treated diﬀerently. Hence, the recurrent comment: “This time
is diﬀerent!”. But this is not the case. Episodes of default and ﬁnancial
crisis have taken place in virtually all countries, speciﬁcally in emerging
market economies as they entered their next stage of development. This
has been almost universally true. This observation should suﬃce to do
justice to the commonly held argument, and practise, that sovereign debt
titles are risk free and should be evaluated as such in the balance sheets
of ﬁnancial intermediaries for examples. They also highlight some general
features that seem to emerge from this overview. They show for instan-
ce that debt crises have often radiated from the centre through commodity
prices, capital ﬂows, interest rates, and shocks to investor conﬁdence. I
believe that the authors overlook the fact the often Governments have
a vested interest in adopting a case-by-case approach. Any regular fea-
ture or causal pattern in fact could give rise to rules or standards that would
tie governments’ hands and limit their individual or collective “ﬂexibi-
25
lity”, including the possibility of ad-hoc arbitrary or opportunistic deci-
sions (Buchanan would have subscribed to this line of reasoning).
In a later, and related, paper, published in 2010, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
argued on the basis of an econometric exercise that when “gross exter-
nal debt reaches 60 percent of GDP”, a country’s annual growth rate de-
clines by 2 percent, and that for levels of external debt in excess of 90 per-
cent, “GDP growth would be roughly cut in half”. Appearing in the af-
termath of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009, the paper Growth in a time
of Debt exerted a profound political inﬂuence. It was in fact interpreted
to provide the analytical, and even quantitative basis, for ﬁscal consoli-
dation and so called “austerity” policies. They pointed to excessive debt
as the main source of ﬁnancial crisis and stagnation, and were able to de-
ﬁne precisely what is “excessive debt”. By diﬀerence, their analysis ena-
bled to establish an objective distinction between what should be con-
sidered destabilising debt and on the other hand pro-growth debt. A neat
and practical distinction between excessive and sustainable debt, in one
sentence between “good” and “bad” debt.
However, for this same reason, the paper stirred a lot of controver-
sy. It was attacked in academia for methodological ﬂaws. In April 2013
Herndon Ash and Pollin in their paper Does High Public Debt Consisten-
tly Stiﬂe Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ used the same
database, corrected for the claimed errors and found that “average GDP
growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90 percent is not dramatically dif-
ferent than when debt/GDP ratios are lower”. They accused Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ of sloppiness, data manipulation and prejudice.
What the Reinhart-Rogoff affairs shows is the extent to which au-
sterity has been sold on false pretences. For three years, the turn to
austerity has been presented not as a choice but a necessity. Econo-
mic research, austerity advocates insisted, showed that terrible things
happen once debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP. But “economic research”
showed no such thing: a couple of economists made that assertion,
while many others disagreed. Policy makers abandoned the unem-
ployed and turned to austerity because they wanted to, not becau-
se they had to.
(Krugman 2013).
The technical discussion on the economic impact of debt still rages on,
because other studies, particularly at the IMF and the OECD showed si-
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milar results to Reinhart-Rogoﬀ, while others disputed or qualiﬁed the-
se results. Others questioned the direction of causation: from slow growth
to high debt, rather than vice versa. In addition, the estimation of ﬁscal
multipliers by policy analysts has been criticized (Blanchard); often they
have been underestimated determining as a consequence of austerity a
much heavier fall in economic growth than expected. The jury is still out
on the scientiﬁc and economic analysis of the relationship between debt,
economic growth, employment and ﬁnancial crisis. Much more work ne-
eds to be done to analyse the dynamic factors at play and provide sup-
port to an informed policy debate on the most appropriate ﬁscal policy
response to the crisis.
However, soon the discussion has turned away from the economic
aspects, and has moved on deeply into political and ideological territo-
ry. It has become a discussion on the merits and demerits of austerity po-
licies, with emotional and ethical undertones. What is at stake here is the
possibility of establishing an analytical and objective foundation to the
deﬁnition of debt sustainability, and consequently constraining the Go-
vernment ability to run its ﬁscal policy as it pleases. On the whole the pre-
ferred and prevailing view on this point is that sustainable debt, which
means “good debt”, can only be decided by politics, by the agreement of
the international community through its intergovernmental fora (the IMF),
by their willingness to make available the required resources to support
countries under stress. Financial markets incorporate the political di-
mension of debt sustainability in their assessments and benchmarks. The-
refore, they are extremely sensitive to countries’ agreements and disa-
greements, and to political risk scenarios that may inﬂuence it.
To conclude, the normative aspects of debt, or debt sustainability, are
ultimately decided upon outside the realm of ethics and the normative
sphere. It is a situation similar to the one we described in the case of cre-
dit and lending. The world of debt operates outside the ethical perime-
ter. It is left to pure considerations of political institutional and power re-
lations. However, in these relations, thanks to democracy, public opinion,
the moods of the electorate or sometimes populist demagogy, ethics re-
surfaces and indirectly it conditions through the political narrative, or
its inﬂuence on economic analysis, the debates and deliberations on pu-
blic debt and public ﬁnance.
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10. the aUSterIty COntrOverSy In eUrOPe: eCOnOmIC Or mOraL?
The discussions on austerity policies in Europe are an even clearer illu-
stration of what it means to separate ethics and debt, the normative and
the ethical spheres. As we said, at the global level, it is ultimately up to
national Governments, both individually and collectively, to deﬁne the
normative aspects of debt, what is “sustainable” and can be sustained,
and what is to be considered “excessive”, and therefore has to be san-
ctioned. Ethics and debt follow parallel tracks.
But the European Union is diﬀerent from a national Government. Many
people say that it is quite an imperfect and incomplete political construction
in comparison to the prevailing model of States and national Governments.
I prefer to say it is an original unprecedented architecture that is still se-
arching for a workable equilibrium both internally and in external rela-
tions. Whatever we may think of it, the EU, unlike national Governments
and political Unions, ﬁnd constraints in sharing and transferring risks and
resources, does not take easily centralised decisions and proceeds main-
ly through harmonised or uniform sets of rules and normative frameworks.
This is particularly so in the ﬁeld of ﬁscal policy. The Fiscal Compact, which
in response to the crisis has been tightened, recalibrated, proceduralised,
but also made more ﬂexible, aims at reducing the risks of ﬁscal indisci-
pline, prevent excessive debts and deﬁcits, minimise transfers and rescue
operations. The outcome of this construction is that ﬁscal sovereignty of
member states in the EU is fundamentally constrained, subject to quan-
titative targets (the Maastricht criteria), authorizations, recommenda-
tions, sanctions, etc. National Governments cannot do as much debt and
deﬁcit as they would like, or need, or are allowed to do by their creditors.
Hence, it is obvious that EU intergovernmental discussions over rules, ﬂe-
xibility, application of the rules, etc. are very frequent and heated. Fiscal
norms therefore have acquired in the EU context an importance that they
do not have in other fora.
National politicians ﬁght to preserve the maximum of their preroga-
tives, try to shake oﬀ regulatory constraints, invoke “ﬂexibility”, portray
the rules as blind and “stupid”, and the European institutions as ”bure-
aucrats” unaccountable to national electorates. European institutions that
have the role of normative watchdogs of ﬁscal discipline, lack “moral” au-
thority and political support, and therefore act often indeed as bureaucrats,
ﬁnding low level compromises, making the processes painstakingly slow
and cumbersome, becoming the scapegoats of all that does not work.
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Where is ethics in all that? Nowhere! National Governments and po-
liticians feel unbound by moral constraints in the amount of deﬁcit and
debt they can make. National electorates prefer debt to tax rises or ex-
penditure cuts. Brussel bureaucrats arbitrate between debtors and cre-
ditors, and stick to the agreed rules. Ethics ends up being whatever it
works. And markets speculate on whether it will continue working, or it
will fall apart.
But this is only the surface of the problem. In reality, ethical consi-
derations dominate the political discussion over austerity policies. Repressed
ethics ﬁnd its way back, sublimated in the popular narratives over debt
and deﬁcit. In the peripheral countries, burdened by public deﬁcits or debt,
there is a widespread resentment over Northern European egoism, lack
of solidarity, obsession with rules that condemn Europe to grow less than
needed, with negative implications for employment and living standards.
Debt is perceived as a “good thing”, because it enables to ﬁnance con-
sumption and investment (the Keynesian argument). And with growth,
debt itself becomes sustainable. Austerity policies are seen as cruel, de-
ﬂationary and often ineﬀective. They in fact depress growth and hit jobs,
penalise the most vulnerable, and even make debts less sustainable.
Northern European people on the contrary feel austerity and ﬁscal
discipline are a necessary medicine for the economy to grow on a more
sustainable basis. They are not prepared to sacriﬁce and pay for the ﬁ-
scal proﬂigacy of debt-ridden countries. They condemn living beyond one’s
means that they consider the root cause of debt. They worry that in case
of default or ﬁnancial crisis – induced by excessive debts – they would
have to pay more taxes in the future. People feel that Governments un-
constrained by austerity would postpone indeﬁnitely necessary and pain-
ful reforms (moral hazard), leaving to them the burden of paying for the
consequences, in terms of a less eﬃcient European economy and ﬁscal
transfers.
Politicians in general do not feel the moral responsibility of reconciling
these diﬀerent, and both to some extent legitimate, moral pressures. They
do not exert moral authority, neither promote they a shared view of the
necessary compromises. Often unscrupulous and populist demagogues
foment the opposite camps feeding prejudice, disinformation and false
expectations. Bad leaders look for scapegoats to their inability to carry
on the required reforms, and get support for it.
Why this happens? Buchanan had clearly foreseen this stalemate, and
explained lucidly the perverse incentive-disincentives mechanisms at play.
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Without addressing explicitly the moral aspects of debt and austerity, it
would be impossible to ﬁnd suitable solutions. Actually, the European ex-
perience has shown that also the Buchanan approach to reform, in terms
of constitutional limits or norms imposing a balanced budget, does not
work. The rules of the Fiscal Compact have to be grounded on convin-
cing ethical bases. Replacing ethical norms with constitutional pre-
scriptions proved to be ineﬀective. Legal prescriptions can only work if
they have a credible and widely accepted moral underpinning. The eco-
nomics of austerity cannot work if the ethics of austerity is not upheld and
supported. The two cannot be replacements for one another.
11. BeyOnD GOOD anD evIL. the rOLe OF the State
The austerity controversy shows that ethics and debt cannot follow pa-
rallel tracks. They have to meet, and rest on joint solid foundations. In
the European experience the normative framework is set on an a-prio-
ri basis, is applied independently of individual Governments, and it should
be binding for them. It looks therefore much closer to a set of ethical norms
than the case-by-case approach and the non-binding character of any in-
tergovernmental G20 or IMF framework.
The position of national Governments in the relationship between debt
and ethics seems to have evolved signiﬁcantly in Europe. Conventionally,
because of its sovereign prerogatives, the State has considered itself e le-
gibus solutus, a kind of Nietzschian Super-man beyond good and evil. Or
better, a “poker giver”, as it is the State that ﬁxes the norms regulating
credit and debit. And in liberal democracies it does so in a secular per-
spective, i.e. without reference to speciﬁc ethical systems. However, in
Europe the State Super-man has been losing ground in the ﬁscal arena.
The Government has to accept pre-determined rules of the game and abi-
de to criteria that constrain its freedom of manoeuvre, its “independence”.
We ﬁnd a conﬁrmation of this evolution in the case of the European
Banking Union, which was established for the Euro-zone after the so-
vereign debt crisis of 2011 and 2012. The Banking Union aims at brea-
king the vicious circle linking ﬁnancial crises with sovereign debt crises
and making the two systemically interdependent. This vicious circle pro-
ved all its damaging strength and pervasiveness in the last crisis. That ex-
perience had shown that a sovereign debt crisis has immediate spillover
eﬀects on the ﬁnancial system creating stress in the solvency of banks,
and that vice versa banking crises aﬀect the ﬁscal situation of the coun-
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tries concerned undermining their public ﬁnances. The solution was found
in establishing a Banking Union, i.e. an institutional framework through
which banks in the Euro-zone are to be separated from their respective
Governments, insulating both of them from reciprocal contagion and in-
stability. Banking Union requires a single supervisor at the level of the
ECB, independent of national governments. It requires also a Europe-
wide regime of bank resolution, so that in case of diﬃculty banks are not
supported or “saved” by “their” Government, but by a European me-
chanism. Finally, it requires a common framework for deposit guarantee
schemes, so that depositors are protected independently of national Go-
vernments. This institutional architecture implies ﬁscal backstops to be
set up at the European level, a Resolution Fund capable of intervening
in all Euro-zone countries, and a single deposit insurance system to as-
sist depositors. It has to be noted that the latter new instruments, which
are not yet operational and still stir heated controversy, represent a si-
gniﬁcant step forwards in the Euro-zone towards risk sharing and a Fi-
scal Union, i.e. a common public budget for the Eurozone operated out-
side the control of national Governments.
Once this overall new construction is completed and becomes fully
operational (it might take still some time, and much discussion), all con-
nections between banks and national Governments are expected to be
cut. All banks will operate then and be managed within a framework of
supra-national European institutions. All banks will be “truly” Europe-
an. As we said, the European level of governance has a peculiar nature,
partly because it is still work in progress, partly because it does not ﬁt the
model of a new Nation State or Super state. This implies that the Euro-
pean regulatory framework is special and diverges signiﬁcantly from other
national banking system. In particular, the ﬁscal backstops in the Euro-
zone are constrained to be minimal, which implies that asset holders and
creditors will have to take on an important part of the default risk in case
of insolvency. Banks therefore according to the new Banking Union re-
gime will not be “bailed out” or “saved” by national Governments. But
they will not be bailed out either by European mechanisms. They will in-
stead be “bailed in“. The burden of adjustment therefore in case of re-
solution will not fall only on taxpayers, but will be shared with share-
holders, junior bondholders and even big depositors.
The advantage of introducing the bail-in regime in the Eurozone is
twofold:
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1. it limits the amount of risk sharing among national budgets through
the common backstops, and avoids the “transfer union” that arouses
so many moral objections in northern Europe; and
2. it minimises the amount of bail-out, and therefore its undesirable con-
sequences in terms of moral hazard and “too-big-to-fail” distorted in-
centives.
The “bail-in” is a revolutionary concept that has limited precedents and
scant correspondence in other banking systems (in the US for instance).
It signals a fundamental shift in the priorities of public policy, from the
protection of savings to that of the taxpayers. Conceptually, it amounts
to a kind of controlled and regulated partial default mechanism. It in fact
penalises creditors. Taxpayers should therefore support it. However, na-
turally it is strongly disliked by bank managers, as it hits share – and bond
– holders and even depositors, and it might therefore determine nega-
tive repercussions on the stock market, the competitive position of the
bank, and possibly spillover eﬀects on public conﬁdence and savings be-
haviour.
12. the new ethICS OF BaIL-InS
The introduction of bail-ins marks a signiﬁcant shift in the ethics of debt.
First, recognition is given to the public-choice moral-hazard argument
that excessive debt accumulation should not be encouraged. Hence, se-
vere limits to bail-outs, even when banks, and with them ﬁnancial sta-
bility, are at stake.
Second, it is consistent however with the conventional view that pu-
blic intervention is necessary (ﬁscal backstops) to safeguard savings, but
limited to low yield and risk free deposits. Systemic crises should be pre-
vented, and public conﬁdence in banks should be maintained. A stable
prosperous competent banking system is to be considered part of the so-
cial capital of a nation.
The third and most interesting aspect of the ethical shift concerns Go-
vernments. With the bail-in principle, national Governments should not
interfere with banks and banking crises. The public good aspects of ban-
king and ﬁnance should be dealt with independently of Governments. This
requires implementing a set of rules, deﬁned on an a-priory basis. And
these rules should be widely held as just and fair. Rules then come be-
fore and stand above national Governments.
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Bail in however requires also the establishment of a light supra-na-
tional Governmental stance, where risks resources and sovereignties of
the national players can be shared. We see here at play an important shift
in the relationship between ethics and the Government. The latter is not
anymore the (primary) source of ethics (ethical State), nor is she total-
ly independent of ethics (secular State). But the Government is subject,
like any other organisation and any ordinary citizen, to ethical principles,
and is committed to uphold them (subsidiarity).
This new approach therefore can be interpreted in my view to mark
the end of the ethical exception for Governments in Europe. And it should
open the way to treating Governments, and Government debts in parti-
cular, like any other organisation – big and small ﬁrms, big and small banks,
etc. –, any citizen, and any debt.
Bail-ins were invented and gradually introduced to address the issue
of “too-big-to-fail”, i.e. the fact that the size of an institution can be so big
that its collapse would have “systemic” repercussions on whole econo-
mies and societies. The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 had clearly shown
how the links of interdependence applied to ﬁnancial institutions could
ultimately undermine ﬁnancial stability and growth at the global level.
It showed also how the awareness of the power of such systemic links could
lead to perverse incentives, rewarding unscrupulous behaviour and en-
couraging reckless risk taking. The crisis pointed out that fraud and abu-
ses had a basis in the “moral hazard” implications of too big to fail. The
“immorality” of moral hazard rested on a ﬂaw of the market mechanism
that had to be corrected. The bail-in regime does exactly that, i.e. it de-
ﬁnes a set of rules designed to give more responsibility to ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and markets in order to put limits to the immorality of moral
hazard.
The new ethics of bail-ins is having profound and wide-ranging im-
plications. It has paved the way to establish rules for sovereign debt re-
structuring, as in the case of Greece, and the European Stability me-
chanism. It has implications for the prudential treatment and evaluation
of sovereign debt at the Basel Committee or the introduction of limits to
the holding of such debt by ﬁnancial intermediaries in the Euro-zone. I
believe it is an ethical break-through, and it is not surprising therefore
that it still arouses intense opposition, deep doubts and sometimes visceral
reactions.
The logic of bail-in can be applied also to governments. Governments
should not be, and should not consider themselves to be, “too-big-to-fail”.
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Above all, sovereign debt, like any other debt, should be governed by a
set of agreed principles, that strike a reasonable balance between the dif-
ferent interests at stake, and that are perceived by the players as fair and
eﬀective. In other terms, it should be dealt with in the framework of a rule
based multilateral international mechanism. A precedent in that direc-
tion is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). Following
extensive lobbying by NGOs and other bodies, the IMF and the World Bank
launched this initiative, which provides debt relief and low-interest lo-
ans to cancel or reduce external debt repayment to “sustainable” level.
Assistance is conditional on the national governments of these countries
(39 poor least developed countries, of which 33 in Sub-Saharan Africa)
meeting a range of performance and economic management targets and
undertaking economic and social reforms. The initiative has been ﬁnanced
by the IMF and creditor countries. Naturally, it encountered resistance and
objections, and tends to be considered an extreme and absolute excep-
tion to the philosophy and standard practises governing public ﬁnance
international relations. However, this initiative allowed precious experience
on debt restructuring to be gained, and coordinated and suitable solutions
to the payment diﬃculties of debtor countries to be discussed in inter-
national fora, like the Paris Club, an informal group of oﬃcials from cre-
ditor countries. Similar processes were organised since the 1970’s for pu-
blic debt held by private creditors, in the so-called London Club. After 2013,
the Paris Forum was put in place, an annual event, jointly organised by
the Paris Club and the rotating Presidency of the G20, convened to pro-
mote a frank and open debate between representatives of creditor and deb-
tor countries, on the global evolutions in the terms of sovereign ﬁnancing
and on the prevention and resolution of sovereign debt crises.
In sum, the genie is now out of the lamp, and new thinking has be-
come possible.
13. a tUrnInG POInt: the POntIFICate OF BeneDICt xvI
After the last ﬁnancial and economic crisis, and in response to it, the Chi-
nese walls between ethics and ﬁnance started to crumble. The demand
for more ethics coming from the world of ﬁnance became more pressing
giving rise to business and policy initiatives for more “sustainable”, more
ethical ﬁnance. In the other direction, there has been a growing interest
and a new focus of moral authorities in relation to what is happening in
the ﬁnancial world.
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I believe that in the latter context, the Pontiﬁcate of Benedict XVI mar-
ked a turning point, a signiﬁcant change in the approach to the ethics of
ﬁnance, and would like therefore to highlight his contribution.
We have seen that most of the practises of ﬁnance and banking took
form in Medieval Europe, and therefore in an environment, dominated
by Christian values and with fundamental contributions from the Catholic
world. Because of the usury question, Catholic thinkers devoted consi-
derable energy to understanding the world of money and credit. They were
among the ﬁrst to identify the primary functions of banking, explore the
risks and opportunities of capital and free trade, demonstrate the mo-
ral legitimacy of charging interest and uphold the good practises of ca-
pital and investment. However, until recently, limited attention was gi-
ven by modern Catholic thinking to ﬁnancial questions.
Modern Catholic social encyclicals have relatively little to say
about financial questions. Even the 2004 Compendium of Catholic
Social Doctrine confines itself to very broad statements about finance
and foreign debt, and it never really addresses the moral dimension
of private and public debt.
(S.Gregg, Debt, Finance, and Catholics, 2011).
But this picture changed completely with Pope Benedict, a highly prai-
sed theologian, a professor, an innovative thinker, elected to manage the
Catholic Church at a particularly turbulent and challenging time.
I think that God, if he was going to make a professor Pope in the first
place, wanted this element of thoughtfulness and precisely this strug-
gle for the unity of faith and reason to come to the fore.
In the book interview with Peter Seewald (Light of the World, 2010), Pope
Benedict singles out “thoughtfulness”, this “characteristic trait” of his, this
“particular feature of German cultural history” to be the deﬁning element
of his mission, and places it at the root of his election to the Papal See.
He added that “to-day it is still the major task of the Church to unite faith
and reason with each other”, putting this “task” at the heart of his Pon-
tiﬁcal programme.
Benedict in the same interview goes on to examine the tragedies of
our time, from crises to conﬂict and climate change, which appear in stri-
king contrast with the enormous progress mankind has made in all ﬁelds.
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[But] what is progress? – asks the Pope. Progress is knowledge (…)
and (…) power. [But] an essential perspective is lacking, namely the
aspect of the good (…) what is good for man and the world. (…) The
ethical aspect, of which responsibility is a basic part, has essential-
ly to a great extent been left out. (…) we see how enormously man’
power has grown. But what did not grow along with it was his ethi-
cal potential (… )[progress has not been] considered in moral terms.
[We need] a new deeper moral awareness.
(ibidem).
Pope Benedict links the main crises of our time to a lack of ethics. At the same
time, he points out encouraging signals of a fundamental change underway.
In view of the threatening catastrophe, there is the recognition eve-
rywhere that we must make moral decisions. There is also (…) awa-
reness of a global responsibility for it; that ethics must not only re-
fer to one’s group or one’s nation. (…) To this extent, a certain po-
tential for moral insight is present. But the conversion of this into
political will (…) and actions (…) [is difficult]. (…) this is a chal-
lenge for the Church. She not only has a major responsibility; she is,
I would say often the only hope.
(ibidem).
Finally, Benedict from this perspective draws insightful implications about
ﬁnance. Asked about the piling up of Government debt to heights never
seen before, the Pope answers going straight to the point:
Naturally, [it is a big moral problem], because we are living at the
expense of future generations. In this respect, it is plain that we are
living in untruth (our underlining). We live on the basis of appea-
rances, and the huge debts are meanwhile treated as something that
we are simply entitled to. (…) Above and beyond the individual fi-
nancial plans, a global examination of conscience is indispensable.
The Church has tried to make a contribution in this regard with the
encyclical Caritas in Veritate.
(ibidem).
It is interesting to note that Benedict places the issue of ﬁlling the gaps
in the ethics of ﬁnance at the core of his magisterium on “reason and faith”,
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“truth and love”. This suggests that ethics in ﬁnance requires both a bet-
ter understanding of how ﬁnance works and what it can contribute to the
common good, and then the enunciation of ethical principles able to gui-
de behaviour and orientate the conscience. But he elaborates more on
this point in the encyclical.
14. the nexUS LInKInG KnOwLeDGe anD vaLUeS
The Caritas in Veritate, issued in 2009, is devoted to social and economic
development. It explores and extends the concept of development as “in-
tegral human development”, and – in a rather lengthy and wide-ranging
narrative – applies it to several important topics relevant for developmental
policies and strategies: from inequality to technological change, from hu-
man rights to poverty, from globalisation to the environment.
The most innovative part of the encyclical is in my view in its phi-
losophical structure that is clearly explained at the beginning, and il-
lustrated later with examples and applications throughout the text. The
essence of the argument lies in the inherent link between Truth and Love,
Knowledge and Solidarity. Benedict intends to complete the loop, ad-
ding to the sequence pointed out by S. Paul of “veritas in caritate”, the
inverse and complementary sequence of “caritas in veritate”. In other
terms, as the search for knowledge that has driven and drives humani-
ty has to be informed by passion, social cohesion and values, so – in the
other direction – the commitment to the common good, solidarity and
brotherhood has to rely to a rigorous pursuit of truth, an investment in
reason and knowledge. In the diﬀerent topics addressed by the encyclical
we see how the two worlds interact and impact on each other in diﬀe-
rent ways. But – above all – they cannot live and operate without one
another.
Truth needs to be sought, found and expressed within the “economy”
of charity, but charity in its turn needs to be understood, confirmed
and practised in the light of truth. (…) Only in truth can charity be
authentically lived. Truth is the light that gives meaning and value
to charity. That light is both the light of reason and the light of faith.
Without truth, charity degenerates into sentimentality. Love becomes
an empty shell (…) it falls prey to contingent subjective emotions and
opinions (…) Truth frees charity from the constraints of an emo-
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tionalism that deprives it of relational and social content, and of a
fideism that deprives it of human and universal breathing-space.
This message appears particularly relevant in the “present social and cul-
tural context” of wide-spread relativism. Values have to be put at the foun-
dation of human development.
Adhering to the values of Christianity is not merely useful, but es-
sential for building a good society and for true integral human de-
velopment. [A world of] charity without truth would be more or less
interchangeable with a pool of good sentiments, helpful for social co-
hesion, but of little relevance. (…) Without truth, charity is confi-
ned to a narrow field devoid of relations. It is excluded from the plans
and processes of promoting human development of universal ran-
ge, in dialogue between knowledge and praxis.
Development, social well-being, the search for a satisfactory solution
to the grave socio-economic problems besetting humanity, all need
this truth.
“Caritas in veritate” – concludes the Pope – “is the principle around which
the Church’s social doctrine turns”.
This “principle” can be translated then in practical “criteria that govern
moral action”. The encyclical goes on to illustrate several of these prac-
tical applications in different fields of the development problematique.
However the most important contribution is in the new and innovati-
ve conceptual framework, and in the fundamental programme of
work that I believe it implies. The encyclical in fact opens the way to a
new perspective on the relationship between ethics and economic ac-
tivity.
15. the ethICaL FOUnDatIOn OF FInanCe
The application of the new “principle” of “caritas in veritate” to the world
of ﬁnance is in par. 65 of the encyclical.
Finance (…) after its misuse, which wreaked such havoc on the real
economy – now needs to go back to being an instrument directed to-
38 ethICS anD FInanCe In SearCh OF a new reLatIOnShIP
wards improved wealth creation and development. Insofar as they
are instruments, the entire economy and finance, not just certain sec-
tors, must be used in an ethical way so as to create suitable condi-
tions for human development and for the development of peoples.
It is certainly useful, and in some circumstances imperative, to launch
financial initiatives in which the humanitarian dimension predo-
minates. However, this must not obscure the fact that the entire fi-
nancial system has to be aimed at sustaining true development.
To-day we hear much talk of ethics in the world of economy, finan-
ce and business. (…) Banks are proposing “ethical” accounts and
investment funds. “Ethical financing is being developed (…) and the
system of ethical certification is spreading (…) These processes are
praiseworthy and deserve much support. Their positive effects are
also being felt in the less developed areas of the world. (…) Efforts
are needed – and it is essential to say this – not only to create “ethi-
cal” sectors or segments of the economy or the world of finance, but
to ensure that the whole economy – the whole of finance – is ethi-
cal, not merely by virtue of an external label, but by its respect for
requirements intrinsic to its very nature.
Finally,
Financiers must rediscover the genuinely ethical foundation of their
activity (our italic).
We see here a clear shift in the approach. Ethics is not something exter-
nal that from the outside imposes limits and constraints to ﬁnancial ac-
tivity. Ethics on the contrary is at the foundations of the ﬁnancial system,
it is the basis of ﬁnance. Without it, ﬁnance cannot operate eﬀectively,
cannot exist. The presumed dichotomy between an “ethical ﬁnance” and
a “ﬁnance” tout-court is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. It does
not stand. As we have seen above, in the world before the encyclical, ﬁ-
nance was generally seen as taking place outside an ethical framework.
Finance was tolerated and generally accepted simply because it was use-
ful and in high demand, but it had to be checked and strictly controlled
for ethical reasons. It required a normative framework deﬁning limits obli-
gations and safeguards. It was a sector ethically at risk. Now, in the new
perspective, not only ethics is not separate and separable from ﬁnance,
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but it represents an essential component of a well-functioning ﬁnancial
sector. Ethics is the foundation of ﬁnance.
16. ethICS anD SOCIaL CaPItaL
Pope Benedict’s Copernican revolution in the ethics of ﬁnance is based
on “truth” (veritas), i.e. on a deeper and more analytical understanding
of how ﬁnancial markets work. There are several reasons why ethics is
essential for ﬁnancial activities. Let us review brieﬂy the main ones.
a) Ethics and trust. Trust is the essence of a ﬁnancial transaction. This
is clearly understood when trust is missing, i.e. in the case of a bank-
run or when there is a credit crunch due to lenders not trusting their
customers. A perceived lack of ethical standards undermines the cre-
dibility and the reputation of the industry, aﬀecting the use of ﬁnancial
tools and services, the insurance penetration rates, access to equity
and securities markets etc.
b) Ethics and fraud. Crimes, scandals, mismanagement in the ﬁnancial
sector have had a negative impact on the functioning of ﬁnancial mar-
kets. This impact consisted in direct costs for ﬁnes sanctions and con-
troversies, but also it has alienated the sympathy of the public opinion
(more taxes and regulatory burden), imposed higher compliance costs.
c) Ethics and risk. Risk management follows its models techniques and
science based standards. But not everything can be precisely measured
and tested. Moral judgement needs to be exercised as well, for instance
in striking the right balance between excessive risk-taking and excessive
risk aversion. Understanding correctly the risk proﬁle of the clients,
and oﬀering to them products that match that proﬁle is not a pure-
ly technical or formal process (think for instance of the mis-selling
of risky ﬁnancial products).
d) Ethics and asset management. In investment and portfolio manage-
ment, ethical considerations should play a role, and they increasin-
gly do so. Responsible investment looks beyond the contingent and
short-term aspects. Green social and corporate governance factors af-
fect the quality and proﬁtability of the assets.
e) Ethics and professionalism. The quality of ﬁnancial services depend
on the commitment and professionalism of the people working in the
sector. Investing in human capital, working in teams and keeping a
strong orientation towards the customer and her satisfaction has to be
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based on a strong foundation of ethical norms. The market not guided
by ethical standard is aﬀected by information asymmetries, transac-
tion costs, conﬂicts of interests that prevent its eﬃcient working (mar-
ket failures). Good faith and correct commercial practises go well be-
yond the formal requirements of “compliance” to laws and regulations.
f) Ethics and labour management practises. The issue of compensation
and wage determination has been discussed and subject to much con-
troversy. In general, public opinion strongly feels that this issue can-
not be left to standard labour market and negotiating mechanisms
(individual and collective). The same is true of productivity arran-
gements and staﬀ involvement in the conduct of the enterprise. The-
re is an ethical component that cannot be ignored.
It is widely understood and recognised that at the foundation of a fun-
ctioning ﬁnancial sector there is a set of rules and regulations, and an ar-
chitecture of institutions providing supervision, regulation, oversight, re-
solution mechanisms, deposit guarantees, etc. This framework has a fun-
damental impact on the quality of the market, and of the services it is ca-
pable of intermediating. It is part of the “social capital” of an economic
and ﬁnancial system. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Because un-
derneath the formal regulatory and institutional structure there are ethi-
cal foundations that ultimately drive the behaviour of individuals and en-
terprises, and create the conditions for good performance. This foundation
has a profound inﬂuence on the mind-set, and the heart, of the people
that supply ﬁnancial services, or demand them. It involves the culture of
risk and the value of thrift, ﬁnancial education and the sentiment of the
public opinion.
Actually, the relationship between ethical norms and ﬁnancial re-
gulation is a complex one. An appropriate balance should be established
between ethical norms and formal legislation and regulation. Often ex-
cessive or formalistic regulation ends up being counterproductive. A gap
in ethics cannot be corrected merely by a surplus of legal norms and in-
trusive supervision. In a police State not necessarily law and order pre-
vail. Ethical capital is an integral and fundamental part of social capital.
Let the laws be clear and simple; let the entire force of the nation be
united in their defence.
(Cesare Beccaria, On Crime and Punishment, p. 56)17
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17. why BanKS are SPeCIaL: the treatment OF InSOLvenCy
Banking insurance and ﬁnance are not like any other sector of economic
activity. They have a special nature, and therefore are treated diﬀeren-
tly from the other sectors. Take for instance the supervisory structure.
Finance is much more regulated and supervised than any other sector of
the economy. Moreover, in many cases Governments interfere with mo-
neylending and banking either by entering the equity capital of banks (na-
tionalisations) or by setting up their own banks. In Germany an impor-
tant part of the banking sector is made up of public banks owned by lo-
cal authorities, e.g. Landesbank. An extreme case was that of Italy that
before the sweeping reforms of the 1990’s had most of its main banks be-
longing to the central Government. Banking was then considered part
of the tasks of the public administration, regulated by a kind of public law.
Now the situation has completely changed, and the Government in Ita-
ly has exited the banking sector altogether. But this is not the case in many
countries, e.g. Germany, and it is frequent that in response to banking
crises or ﬁnancial instability the Government intervenes by taking con-
trol or “saving” banks; which would not happen so frequently for other
kinds of corporations. The treatment of bank insolvency is a very clear
illustration of how and why banks are “special”, and diﬀerent from the
standard case of corporate bankruptcy. To the extent that a special term
is used to refer to bank bankruptcy, i.e. bank “resolution”. Let us discuss
the instance in some detail.
In their book on “The economics of bank bankruptcy law”, Marinc and
Razvan-Vlahu address the question in a straightforward way: “Are
banks special?”, and illustrate the implications of this special nature for
bank bankruptcy law. “Banks are diﬀerent from other corporations in se-
veral ways making corporate bankruptcy law ill-suited for resolving bank
bankruptcies.” Five reasons are mentioned to explain this “specialty”:
a) Trust in the ﬁnancial sector is crucial. Banks are subject to runs and
other destabilising processes that make timely intervention in case
of insolvency crucial. Otherwise, the risk is of “imminent unravelling”,
loss of trust from the public, and ultimately in case of contagion the
collapse of the whole ﬁnancial sector.
b) A bank failure imposes costs that go well beyond the individual in-
stitution involved and its customers. Spill over eﬀects may be sub-
stantial. Economists say that bank insolvency creates substantial ex-
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ternalities for the economy at large, and that the social cost of a bank
failure exceeds the private cost.
c) Banks are subject to prudential regulation and the provision of safety
nets, including deposit insurance. The existence of such normative
frameworks may exacerbate incentive problems and induce banks to
take on excessive risk.
d) Banks rely normally on explicit or implicit government guarantees,
which interfere with the eﬀectiveness of bankruptcy procedures in
an ex-post sense (i.e. for failing banks).
e) Banks activities are subject to diﬀerent regulatory and supervisory
agencies with diﬀerent objectives and requirements. This creates pos-
sible incoherence and coordination problems. Such problems esca-
late substantially for cross-border ﬁnancial intermediaries and ope-
rations. Lack of coordination and divergence in bank insolvency re-
gimes lead to ineﬃcient procedures.
For all the reasons above resolving banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
is a much more complex and delicate exercise than winding up non ﬁ-
nancial corporations, and requires a special insolvency regime. The re-
cent crisis provided a vivid illustration of the kind of dilemma that banks
pose when faced with bankruptcy risks. At one horn of the dilemma we
ﬁnd the case of Lehman Brothers. At the opposite one, that of the bail-
outs of several European banks at the expense of tax payers. Applying to
a ﬁnancial institution insolvency procedures similar to those generally
used for non-ﬁnancial corporations, as it was done for Lehman, led to the
catastrophic consequences of the 2007-2009 global collapse. That is: sy-
stemic instability, risk of melt down of the whole world ﬁnancial system,
standstill of the wholesale funding and interbank market, severe economic
recession, dramatic loss of value added incomes and jobs. At the other
end of the spectrum, the later experience of failing banks in Ireland, Spain,
Portugal, Germany and other European countries led to similarly unsa-
tisfactory outcomes. Recapitalisations and bail-outs with massive injec-
tions of public money and nationalisations brought about undesirable con-
sequences that became immediately apparent and had a lasting impact
on public ﬁnances, the economy, politics and the public opinion of the
aﬀected countries. I refer here to the moral hazard implications in terms
of excessive risk taking; to the implicit subsidies to the bank shareholders
and bad management at the tax payer expense; to the neutralisation of
market discipline in promoting eﬃciency and good corporate governance,
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to the distortions introduced in the competitive environment by allowing
illiquid banks to compete with well capitalised and well managed in-
termediaries.
The world found itself caught between a rock and a hard place, as both
horns of the dilemma in treating bank insolvency proved to be highly inap-
propriate. Clearly a more suitable approach has to be found, which im-
plies designing a bank bankruptcy regime that is speciﬁc and departs sub-
stantially from ordinary insolvency procedures, and takes into account
the special nature of banking.
I would like now to focus more on the special functions of banks in
the economic and social system, as they have special relevance from the
ethical point of view. I will brieﬂy discuss in particular:
a) Banks as liquidity providers;
b) Systemic impact of ﬁnancial activities;
c) Pervasive moral hazards;
d) Credit creation and leverage
e) Redistributive and social implications.
The point I wish to argue is that while many economic sectors may be con-
sidered special and diﬀerent form one another, banks have special fea-
tures that are particularly relevant from the ethical standpoint. That is
why the ethics of ﬁnance is also special, diﬀerent from the ethics of any
other business.
18. BanKS aS LIqUIDIty PrOvIDerS
Liquidity is a public good. It can be managed privately (by hoarding
inherently liquid assets), but it would be socially inefficient for pri-
vate banks and other financial institutions to hold liquid assets on
their balance sheets in amounts sufficient to tide them over when mar-
kets become disorderly. They are meant to intermediate short ma-
turity liabilities into illiquid assets and (normally) liquid liabilities
into illiquid assets. Since central banks can create unquestioned li-
quidity at the drop of a hat, in any amount and at zero cost, they
should be the liquidity providers of last resort both as lender of last
resort and as market maker of last resort.
(Willem Buiter, 2007).
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It is commonly accepted that liquidity (asset liquidity, market liquidity,
funding liquidity etc.) provides a number of public beneﬁts, in terms of
positive externalities, both within the ﬁnancial system, and from the ﬁ-
nancial system towards the rest of the economy. A liquid foreign exchange
market for example may facilitate international trade and the process of
industrial specialisation based on comparative advantage.
The importance of liquidity for a functioning economic system has been
particularly appreciated in occasion of liquidity crises. It was rightly for
the purpose of addressing recurrent ﬁnancial crises that Central Banks
were established and assigned the mission of managing the liquidity of
ﬁnancial markets. For instance it was shown (see Bernstein, Hughson and
Weidenmier 2011) in relation to the early US ﬁnancial history that pe-
riods without ﬁnancial institutions acting as a central bank market volatility
was substantially higher during the harvest timje than during the rest of
the year. During periods instead with ﬁnancial institutions such as the U.S.
Second Bank (1816-1836) or the Federal Reserve (1915-1925) seasonal
liquidity crises disappeared. This proves that the founding of the Fed was
a watershed event for improving the liquidity of ﬁnancial markets.
However, deep and liquid markets do not only depend on eﬀective
public policies and central banks. They are the output of the overall ﬁ-
nancial intermediation process, involving private players, the issuers, in-
vestors, depositors and banks. A considerable amount of work has been
done to identify the various determinants of market liquidity (see for a
survey Marès). Among the many factors having a bearing on liquidity, we
may list competitive market structure, transaction costs, the fragmentation
of the market (amount of fungible assets), the role of infrastructure, and
above all the diversity and behaviour of market participants.
Banks have a special role as liquidity providers, both to their borro-
wers, in terms of loan commitments, and to their creditors, in the form
of liquid demand deposits. Deposits should be seen therefore not only as
liabilities, but also as an additional value of the bank. In collecting de-
posits and making loans banks perform a role that goes well beyond the
contractual arrangements with its clients. In providing liquidity to mar-
ket participants, they provide opportunities for ﬁrms of all sizes, and par-
ticularly SMEs, to have access to funding, alleviate price volatility, lower
the cost of funding. When a bank increases its balance sheet, it contri-
butes also to trading, eﬃciency in the allocation of resources and ﬁnan-
cial stability. Positive externalities of intermediation via liquidity are con-
siderable.
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This broad function of banking can also be seen from the side of ne-
gative externalities. When a bank downsizes its balance sheet, it may im-
prove its proﬁtability and strengthen its capital position, but it destroys
value for the economy at large. That is why, when an insolvency there-
at materializes, it would not make sense to apply to banks the standard
mechanism used in non ﬁnancial bankruptcy of imposing an automatic
stay to manage creditors’ coordination problems. Freezing debt repay-
ment in bank bankruptcy would impact liquidity and destroy value. Si-
milarly, the dismantling of the bank liability side, particularly if rapid in
case of runs, would also destroy value. The liquidity provision adds va-
lue to banks’ clients, but makes banks intrinsically unstable. In relation
to banks, the coordination problem of being the ﬁrst creditor to collect
is especially acute, being rooted in the withdrawal-upon-demand and se-
quential-service-constraint features of the deposit contract. Coordination
problems between bank depositors are much more severe due to matu-
rity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Besides banks are interlin-
ked. Freezing liabilities would create problems for other banks (systemic
risks). That is why coordination problems in the case of failing banks can-
not be solved by using an automatic stay and freezing of debt contracts.
Deposits in case of bank insolvency need to be guaranteed, and the de-
posit book should be passed on rapidly to another stable bank. In all this,
timely intervention is crucial. Bank runs may be triggered by pure panics.
The bank’s demise would become in this case a self-fulﬁlling prophesy
19. the SyStemIC ImPaCt OF FInanCIaL aCtIvItIeS
After the sub-prime crisis in the US and the sovereign debt crisis in Eu-
rope, and in response to those crises, the issue of systemic risk in the ﬁ-
nancial sector has attracted considerable attention as an academic and
a policy topic. The two crises in fact had shown the extent of the dama-
ge that a ﬁnancial crisis may cause to the real economy, and the fact that
ﬁnancial institutions did not internalise the costs of such negative ex-
ternalities. Addressing systemic risk therefore became a priority of the
new wave of regulatory improvements introduced following the crisis,
and lie at the heart of the Dodd-Franck Act in the US and the Basel III
agreement.
If one bank goes bankrupt, deposit holders may interpret this event
as a signal of solvency problems in the entire ﬁnancial sector and react
by massive withdrawals of funds. Bank runs and panic can lead to sharp
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monetary contraction, especially detrimental to SMEs, and induce a re-
cession. Empirical research has conﬁrmed that the costs of bank crises
are high.
In order to avoid systemic crises, deposit insurance and public inter-
ventions such as bail-outs or even nationalisation are standard instruments.
However, such remedies create problems too, by encouraging excessive
risk taking. Bagehot, as early as in 1873 had introduced the idea, still po-
pular now, that in order to prevent systemic crises central banks should
lend at a penalty rate to illiquid but solvent banks, against good collate-
ral. However, it is not easy to know when a bank in distress is insolvent,
or merely illiquid. In practise regulators are often reluctant to close down
insolvent banks, because it is diﬃcult to distinguish between illiquid and
insolvent institutions, it is easier to stem contagion risk by rescuing trou-
bled banks than liquidating them. Sometimes forbearance is motivated
by motivation concerns, when regulators do not want to admit their er-
rors. The second round systemic impact therefore, due to regulators and
policy responses, are often not less harmful than the ﬁrst round ones.
Firm size is typically considered the main driver of systemic risk ex-
posure, and large banks are generally thought of as being the systemi-
cally important ones. However, there is growing evidence in the litera-
ture (see Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven, and Varotto and Zhao), and in
practise, that size may not be a persistent determinant of systemic risk,
nor be a prominent contagion factor among banks. The case of Northern
Rock is often cited as an illustration of the fact that a relatively small bank
can have a high contagion potential. Let us recall that only days before
its demise, the UK Financial Service Authority had stated that the bank
“is solvent, exceeds its regulatory capital requirements, and has a good
quality loan book”. More recently in 2016, four small Italian local
banks were resolved applying the new EU bail-in regime. Although their
size was negligible in relation to the size of the market, the case risked
determining systemic eﬀects and caused alarm pushing the Government
to introduce corrective measures (compensation for a few most vulne-
rable bond holders).
Beyond size, other factors play a role in determining exposure to sy-
stemic risk and contagion possibilities, among which higher leverage, lo-
wer tier 1 capital and interconnectedness. Therefore not only “too-big-
too-fail” matters, but also “too-complex and too-interconnected-to fail”.
Interconnectedness is a key feature of the ﬁnancial sector. Among the
various sectors, ﬁnance is the most integrated into the structure of the
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real economy. Other service sectors, such as energy, transport and in-
frastructure, are also closely interconnected with industrial production.
But ﬁnance beats them all. This is essentially due to the payment systems
and payment functions that operate through banks and other ﬁnancial
intermediaries, and aﬀect all economic transactions. A ﬁnancial crisis re-
verberates immediately therefore into a collapse of trade and economic
activity. More broadly, the importance of trust and public conﬁdence, as
social capital, in ﬁnancial transactions plays a role here. Add that ﬁnance
is a rather technical activity, and that the level of information and ﬁnancial
education of the customers and the general public is relatively low and
of poor quality.
That is why the issue of systemic impact and contagion concerns not
only systemically important and global ﬁnancial institution (G-SIFIs),
which are subject to speciﬁc new regulation and requirements, but to some
extent all banks and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
20. PervaSIve mOraL hazarDS
Whenever safety nets, public subsidies and Government guarantees
operate, inevitably moral hazard considerations apply. But in no other sec-
tor of the economy moral hazard is more intensive and pervasive than in
ﬁnance. And pour cause! For the very reason that “ﬁnance is special”, and
therefore more highly regulated and more sheltered than other sectors.
Deposit insurance, implicit and explicit Government guarantees crea-
te incentives in banks for excessive risk taking, distort competition bet-
ween banks, and undermine the role of market discipline. Furthermo-
re, moral hazard is more virulent because deposits are collected normally
from several small and uninformed savers with limited monitoring abi-
lities. This contrasts sharply with the case of non-ﬁnancial corporations,
where there is in general a smaller number of creditors, and one of them
(i.e. a bank) has a special role in monitoring. Hence, deposit guarante-
es do not usually apply to large depositors, as in the case of the new ban-
king resolution regime in the Eurozone, leaving them subject to bail-in
procedures.
In the case of failing banks, moral hazard can have particularly har-
mful consequences. During the 1980’s US Savings and Loans crisis, the-
re is evidence that weakly capitalised thrifts engaged in moral hazard be-
haviour not only undertaking excessively risky activities but also illegally
stealing from their institutions (looting). In the crisis of Mexican banks,
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it was also shown that banks engaged in “related lending”, i.e. lending
to corporations owned by bank owners.
Opaqueness, implicit government guarantees and deposit insuran-
ce create an environment that enables the survival of undercapitalised
banks, so called “zombie banks” (Kane). Such banks are highly exposed
to the risk of morally hazardous behaviour, determining substantial costs
for the economy as a whole. These banks in fact no longer perform their
role of monitoring their borrowers, and therefore end up distorting com-
petition for funding and displacing well-managed borrowers.
Moral hazard and conﬂict of interests, often induced by measures ai-
med at promoting ﬁnancial stability, create ultimately themselves a thre-
at to ﬁnancial stability. They pose to regulators and public authorities a
challenging task. Sometimes regulators fall into the temptation of reac-
ting by increasing the regulatory burden, raising capital requirements,
imposing costly separation between the core banking activities of retail
lending and investment (narrow banking). But these are palliatives. Mo-
reover, excessive regulation has heavy undesirable eﬀects and does not
guarantee the elimination of moral hazard.
The presence of cross border banks complicates the picture further,
as banks are subject to diﬀerent regulators and sometimes-conﬂicting ar-
rangements. An internationally agreed framework of common institutional
mechanisms would be necessary to make cross border banking work smoo-
thly.
In sum, the dense network of institutional safeguards and arrange-
ments governing banking and ﬁnancial intermediation, due to the “spe-
cial nature” of the banking industry, create an environment of ethical risk
and proneness to moral hazard.
Ethics then should come at the centre stage.
21. CreDIt CreatIOn anD LeveraGe
The mechanisms through which banks create value added and wealth have
always raised mixed feelings of astonishment wonder and suspicion. Even
though bankers are often called “intermediaries”, they certainly are a spe-
cial brand of “traders”. In fact, in intermediating between borrowers and
lenders, loans and deposits, banks do not simply “transfer” or distribu-
te resources. They “create” them.
The economics textbook example of the “credit multiplier” or “deposit
multiplier” provides an emblematic representation of this rather esote-
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ric and mysterious process of wealth creation. 100 Euros deposited in the
bank’s vault, assuming a reserve coeﬃcient of 5%, become immediate-
ly, and magically, a capital of 2000 Euros that can be lent to needy bor-
rowers and spent for consumption or investment. Financial resources pos-
sess to some extent the attribute of “non-rivalry” that characterizes pu-
blic goods, like knowledge: its use for loans to some borrower does not
prevent the use of other borrowers.
Financial leverage is a powerful mechanism capable of magnifying
investment gains and losses. Individuals who use borrowed funds to in-
vest are leveraged. Real estates for instance are often purchased with the
lender’s capital, so that borrowers can use it at the same time it is being
paid for. Another example is when individuals engage in ﬁnancial tran-
sactions using margins. Without ﬁnancial leverage, long-term investment
would be impossible. At the same time, leverage increases return vola-
tility and insolvency risks. It is one of the main sources of ﬁnancial cri-
ses in history (see Odekon). And it has plaid a critical role in the last cri-
sis of 2007-2009.
Considering this tremendous power, and responsibility, of bankers
in the creation of wealth, it does not come as a surprise that they have
been subject to checks and controls from public bodies as part of their
mandate of managing and steering monetary policy. One of the main tasks
of monetary authorities in fact is to set and regulate money supply, as a
tool of macroeconomic management in the pursuit of inﬂation and eco-
nomic growth targets. As banks have an important role through the cre-
dit multiplier in creating “broad” money, Central Banks have conven-
tionally imposed reserve ratios that constrain the ability of ordinary banks
of inﬂuencing the quantity of money.
We may then ask: have Central banks been able to neutralise or mi-
tigate the extraordinary powers of bankers?, and in so doing have they
re-established the primacy of public policy over money creation? Late-
ly this does not seem to have been the case. Let us see what Central Ban-
kers themselves have to say on this point.
The Bank of England’s 2014 Quarterly Review contains a detailed de-
scription of how money creation works in the UK, rejecting orthodox theo-
ries of money creation (see McLeay et alii, 2014).
The reality of how money is created to-day differs from the descrip-
tion found in some economics textbooks. Rather than banks receiving
deposits when households save and then lending them out, bank len-
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ding creates deposits. In normal times, the central bank does not fix
the amount of money in circulation, nor is central bank money “mul-
tiplied up” into more loans and deposits.
Commercial banks create money, in the form of bank deposits, by ma-
king new loans. When a bank makes a loan, for example to someo-
ne taking out a mortgage to buy a house, it does not typically do so
by giving them thousands of pounds worth of banknotes. Instead, it
credits their bank account with a bank deposit of the size of the mor-
tgage. At that moment, new money is created.
In other terms, new deposits are created when banks lend. And when more
loans are being paid oﬀ than are being created, money in circulation di-
minishes. That is why Quantitative Easing in a deleveraging cycle plays
a fundamental replacement role for inadequate bank credit creation.
Central Banks do not typically choose a quantity of reserves (…) Ra-
ther, they focus on prices – setting interest rates. The supply of (…)
base money is determined by banks’ demand for reserves both for
the settlement of payments and to meet demand for currency from
their customers (…). So reserve creation responds to demand for bank
loans, rather than driving it.
(ibidem).
Victor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB, argues in a similar vein:
It is argued by some that financial institutions would be free to in-
stantly transform their loans from the central bank into credit to the
non-financial sector. This fits into the old theoretical view about the
credit multiplier according to which the sequence of money creation
goes from the primary liquidity created by central banks to total mo-
ney supply created by banks via their credit decisions. In reality the
sequence works more in the opposite direction with banks taking first
their credit decisions and then looking for the necessary funding and
reserves of central bank money. (2011).
Therefore, in money creation commercial banks have a prominent role
to play.
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There is no evidence that either the monetary base or M1 leads the
credit cycle, although some economists still believe this monetary
myth. Both the monetary base and M1 series are generally pro-cy-
clical and, if anything, the monetary base lags the credit cycle slightly.
Finn Kydland and Ed Prescott (Nobel Prize winners), Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis (1990).
A new literature has emerged in the last two decades shedding light not
only on how commercial banks contribute to the creation of money and
credit, but also on how the channels of transmission of monetary poli-
cy operate (see Kashyap and Stein). The standard hypothesis of a passi-
ve mechanical role of bank lending, merely reacting to the signals of mo-
netary authorities in steering reserves and setting interest rates, was put
into question (Carpenter and Demilrap). First, the development of ﬁnancial
markets driven by liberalisation, growing cross border operations and te-
chnological innovation; and later, the impact of the crisis on monetary
policy tools and the recourse to unconventional instruments, changed fun-
damentally our understanding of the inter-linkages between ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the real economy, and of the policy challenges of stabilisation
and growth. Two were the major outcomes: the perception that, in con-
trast with the conventional view of the deposit multiplier, monetary tran-
smission mechanisms are complex, varied and still underexplored; and
that banks and markets have a primary role to play in the policy tran-
smission channels. Central banks cannot by themselves automatically con-
trol the monetary aggregates, because there are non-reservable mone-
tary instruments, like mutual funds, that mimic checking accounts; be-
cause banks are not just deposit creators, but react to monetary signals
through a lending response; and because capital markets provide a va-
riety of funding channels, complementary to bank lending. Against the
conventional hypothesis, a banco-centric view of monetary transmission
has now spread, which gives banks a key function in the process. This fun-
ction depends on the ability of banks to oﬀset monetary-policy-
induced deposit outﬂows and on the degree of bank dependence of ﬁrms
and customers.
Banks then have been recognised to be key players in the monetary tran-
smission mechanisms. They rely on deposit ﬁnancing and adjust their loan
supply schedules following changes in bank reserves. They entertain a spe-
cial relationship with certain borrowers, like for instance SMEs, that are
bank-dependent and cannot easily oﬀset these shifts in bank loan supply.
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Thus, not only banks participate actively in money creation, but they
perform an important public policy role in the delivery of monetary po-
licy, and therefore in macroeconomic management. They are signiﬁcant
policy actors. The allegory therefore of bankers as King Midas transfor-
ming in gold whatever they touch should not appear too much oﬀ the
mark. Bankers in a certain sense enjoy royal prerogatives. However, to-
gether with them, they should also bear royal responsibilities, earn re-
spect and credibility. The ethical standards associated to their mission
should be of the highest degree, well above those of other professionals
and ordinary citizens.




Peter Praet, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, speaking in July
2016 at a meeting on the transmission channels of monetary policy, hi-
ghlighted the redistributive impact of the ECB accommodating policy
stance:
What we have seen is a redistribution of purchasing power among
different types of households. Specifically, resources have moved from
net savers with a low marginal propensity to consume to net borrowers
with a high marginal propensity to consume, creating an overall po-
sitive impact on aggregate consumption.
(Praet).
There is a considerable, and comprehensible, reticence in discussing how
monetary policy decisions, taken by independent monetary authorities,
impact on the distribution of income and wealth.
This redistribution is an unintended side-effect of monetary policy
(…) [that should give a] boost to disposable income (…) [and thus
contribute to] supporting consumption and investment.
(ibidem).
But it should be beyond any doubt that decisions of ﬁnancial market pla-
yers and policymakers have a signiﬁcant impact on personal and functional
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income distribution. Actually, it is regrettable that more resources are not
invested in the analysis of such an impact, not only to support an infor-
med policy discussion, but also to stimulate if required remedial policy
intervention, because the redistributive eﬀects of monetary policy can
be largely controlled and corrected.
Bringing economic resources and money where it is most needed: this
is the essence of ﬁnance. Allocating savings, moving it from where it ori-
ginates to where it is employed for consumption, investment or public ex-
penditure implies redistributing resources across individuals, social
groupings, enterprises, sectors of activity, locations (including cross-bor-
der). Financial markets accomplish this allocative function ensuring (un-
der certain conditions) – as all markets do – market clearing and Pare-
to eﬃciency. Institutional mechanisms provide for correcting market im-
perfections and reaching the desired targets of social welfare. Distribu-
tion is particularly important as it involves the time dimension, and the-
refore the relationship between the present and the future, and the as-
sessment of risks and potentials. If ﬁnance did not exist, resources would
remain where they have been created and not currently used, with peo-
ple that do not currently need them, and depriving people who need them.
And in fact where ﬁnance is underdeveloped, durable consumption and
investment are monopolized by the rich and powerful, and by the old.
Finance then plays per se a powerful redistributive role, and by-and-
large a fair and positive one. Just ask any start-upper or small ﬁrm or young
couple.
The risk aspects are particularly relevant in the allocation of ﬁnan-
cial resources. Thanks to ﬁnance, and through ﬁnancial processes,
(Knightian) uncertainty is transformed into measurable and managea-
ble risk. This transformation process appear particularly evident in the
case of an insurance contract, where savings are managed to provide pro-
tection from future risk. But the logic of foresight, security, precaution
can be extended to cover all ﬁnancial contracts and transactions. In all
ﬁnancial contracts there is an element of risk assessment and risk pro-
tection. A functioning ﬁnancial market enables risk sharing, risk transfer
and risk trading.
Inversely, ﬁnance allows the maximisation of present and future op-
portunities. Whenever in fact there is a risk, there is also an opportuni-
ty. Placing trust on the ability of people, ﬁrms and institutions, to inno-
vate, create wealth and generate streams of future income, is a formidable
lever of dynamism and entrepreneurship in an economy and society. To
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assess the capacity of ideas and projects to produce fruit in the future,
and to promote the role of merit in competition, social interchange and
transactions: these are some of the most challenging and rewarding tasks
for a ﬁnancier. Giving people opportunities and encouraging talent and
commitment is another important feature of the mission of ﬁnance. Cre-
ditworthiness and meritocracy have similar etymological roots, and are
inherently linked.
Analysing the redistribution implications of ﬁnancial systems, and their
impact on productivity and social cohesion is a promising ﬁeld of theo-
retical and empirical investigation, and an important terrain of policy di-
scussions. Our general considerations here should suﬃce to add another
relevant dimension to the special character of the ﬁnancial industry. Its
role in providing protection and opportunities, in allocating resources ef-
fectively, and in encouraging foresight and precaution introduce in the
output of the industry an element of “public good”, or quasi-public good
that is not present in other sectors of the economy. A well-functioning and
developed ﬁnancial system therefore is part of the essential public in-
frastructure of a nation, and of her social capital.
23. the SOCIaL rOLe OF FInanCe
We have surveyed several aspects of banking and ﬁnance that give this
industry a special signiﬁcance and connotation from the ethical point of
view.
Banking is not like any other sector of the economy. It is more closely
and systemically interconnected with other trades, and their communi-
ties. It performs special functions of a “quasi-public” nature, such as li-
quidity provision, money creation, protection from risk and the tran-
smission of monetary policy. It has particularly meaningful, and worthy,
allocative and distributive implications that acquire special value for ad-
vanced market economies and pluralist democracies. It is more exposed
to moral hazards and conﬂicts of interest.
The conclusion is that banking and ﬁnance have a stronger social role
than other sectors, and require therefore stronger ethical foundations.
Business ethics – we can say – is a foundation of any economic activity,
as it is part of the social capital of a nation and provide an essential in-
frastructure of a well-functioning market economy. But in relation to ﬁ-
nance, given its special nature and signiﬁcance, ethics plays a bigger role.
Standards of ethical behaviour in ﬁnance are higher, and expectations
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of compliance with those standards are also higher. This not only
should be so; but it should be visibly credibly and convincingly so; and
should be perceived to be so by the public.
Like other economic agents in the market economy, ﬁnanciers pur-
sue their self-interest and are driven by the proﬁt motivation, but they
have to do it in a way that is highly sensitive to the true interests of their
clients and to the general interest. Stronger ethical and deontological mo-
tivation is required of bankers and ﬁnanciers. It is not suﬃcient to respect
the law and behave honestly. Not anybody qualiﬁes for ﬁnancial jobs. And
it is more a matter of professional ethics than skills.
To illustrate this point, an analogy comes to mind drawn from the con-
cept of “professionalism” and its origin in history. After all, ﬁnancial skil-
led work can be considered itself a manifestation of such “professiona-
lism”, and a very noticeable one. The term “profession” comes etymolo-
gically from “the profession of faith” that the exercise of certain tasks and
activities, for their special nature called “professions”, required of the peo-
ple that were elected to carry them out. To be allowed to enter these spe-
cial functions, such people were required to have particular qualiﬁcations
and training that was ﬁrst of all of an ethical nature, and only later of te-
chnical content. In the high Middle Ages, when “Universities” were esta-
blished, the three main, and only, professions were Theology, Law and
Medicine. To be admitted to University training, students had to “take or-
ders” and demonstrate to be especially devoted to faith and religion. The
professional process started then, and had to start, with a “profession of
faith”.
Mutatis mutandis, we may say now that to enter the “professions” in
banking and ﬁnance, higher ethical qualiﬁcations are required, before and
above the speciﬁc technical skills and experience that make up a good ban-
ker. The diﬃculty is that in modern democratic and secular societies no
formal certiﬁcation can guarantee such standards ex-ante. But deonto-
logical training and so-to-speak “initiation” can be quite useful on that
score.
In to-day’s world of ﬁnance, unfortunately, the awareness of such hi-
gher and stricter ethical requirements has been lacking, and the perception
of ﬁnanciers in the eyes of the public opinion, and their reputation has
been quite far from this awareness. The credibility of the ﬁnancial world
has thus been aﬀected, and with it the popular sentiment vis-à-vis ﬁnance
and public trust. This has eroded the foundations of ﬁnancial activities
and made them more complex and less proﬁtable.
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24. tOwarDS the ethICaL reCaPItaLISatIOn
OF the FInanCIaL InDUStry
In the last crisis, the widespread erosion of the ethical foundations of ﬁ-
nancial capital has become apparent. Even more so in the response to the
crisis. To the point that the usefulness of ﬁnance for economic growth and
development has been put in doubt. A “neo-luddite” attitude has emerged
that has preached the need to “deﬁnanciarise” the economy. Less ﬁnan-
ce, more real economy – this was the slogan. The paradox is that this “wind
mill ﬁght” took place in the middle of a process, still underway, where the
role of ﬁnance for global growth and stability was, and still is increasing,
and with it its relative size in relation to the real economy. In an insightful
report of 2012 (Bain Report), titles A World Awash in Money, we read:
The relationship between the financial economy and the underlying
real economy has reached a turning point. The rate of growth of world
output of goods and services has seen an extended slowdown over
the recent decades while the volume of global financial assets has ex-
panded at a rapid pace. By 2010, global capital had swollen to some
$600 trillion, tripling over the past two decades. Today, total financial
assets are nearly ten times the value of global output of all gods and
services. (…) To navigate the shifting currents of global growth in
a time of capital superabundance will require financial market par-
ticipants to recalibrate their expectations, (…) and exercise enor-
mous investment discipline.
(Bain Report 2012).
The 2014 Geneva Report on “Deleveraging? What deleveraging?” echo-
es the previous analysis and comes to similar conclusions:
Contrary to widely held beliefs, the world has not yet begun to dele-
ver and the global debt-to-GDP is still growing breaking new highs
(…). Deleveraging and slower nominal growth are in many cases in-
teracting in a vicious loop, with the latter making the deleveraging
process harder and the former exacerbating the economic slowdown.
Moreover, the global capacity to take on debt has been reduced through
the combination of slower expansion in real output and lower inflation.
(Geneva Report 2014).
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The jury is still out on whether such patterns are pathological and ex-
traordinary, and will be brought back to normality after a full recovery
out of the crisis, or instead they represent a “new normality” requiring
unconventional policy responses in the medium term and in-depth struc-
tural reforms. The academic and policy discussion on this point is still ra-
ging and we can only hope that they reach soon more conclusive results
providing ﬁrmer indications to policymaking (as an example of opposi-
te points of view, see Cecchetti and Kharroubi, and Levine). I believe that
in the post-crisis scenario the impact of ﬁnance on growth potential has
become much greater than before, due to the growing uncertainties that
economic agents are facing (related for instance to aging, climate chan-
ge or terrorism), the need for long-term investment and to global inter-
dependencies requiring in-depth governance adjustments and risk sha-
ring mechanisms. I believe therefore that there is still scope for a growing
ﬁnancial sector, relative to the rest of the economy, even if this will re-
quire considerable adjustments in the governance mechanisms (e.g. stren-
gthening of global regulation), more innovation and transparency, and
more ﬁnancial education of the public. But it may well be the case, as Cec-
chetti for instance argues, that there Is a limit to the size of the ﬁnancial
sector after which productivity growth and innovation are negatively af-
fected (see also Samargandi et alii).
Under any circumstances however, we should avoid falling into the trap
of prejudice and disinformation. And it is undoubted that the ethical cri-
sis of ﬁnance has fed both prejudice and disinformation. Reconstructing
therefore public conﬁdence around the mission and role of ﬁnance is a pre-
condition for better understanding how to navigate in the unchartered wa-
ters the global economy ﬁnds itself in, and put on the right track the re-
lationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth.
It is undoubted that the last crisis has had a pervasive and disrupti-
ve eﬀect on the ethical foundations of ﬁnance, or perhaps that such foun-
dations (or lack thereof) have been at the root of the ﬁnancial crisis it-
self. The crisis in fact has shown to what extent the world of ﬁnance is
undercapitalised from the ethical point of view. But in response to the
crisis a refoundation of ﬁnance has been started. A foundation relying on
stronger ethical bases has been perceived as imperative, and is now un-
derway. The tide has turned, and there is now a new awareness in the
ﬁnancial industry.
The time is ripe then for a new beginning in the relationship between
ethics and ﬁnance, based on stronger and ﬁrmer conceptual foundations.
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25. the next StaGe In the reLatIOnShIP
Between ethICS anD FInanCe
We started our story tracing back into the distant past the unresolved an-
tagonism between ethics and ﬁnance. In the gift economy that charac-
terized exchanges in traditional communities, lending at interest repre-
sented a threat. It undermined the network of solidarity and generosi-
ty that deﬁned those communities. A family, a village, a religious com-
munity, an association of friends, a club, must work on the principle “one
for all” and “all for one”. Exchanges are to be grounded in personal re-
lationships and informal reciprocities. Therefore, one should lend “wi-
thout expecting any return”. “If you lend only where you expect to be re-
paid, what credit is that to you?” (Sermon on the Mountain).The exception
was also consistent with this ethical framework: you may lend with in-
terest to a stranger, and only to him. Because he is not like your fellow
compatriots, he is not your brother, and he does not belong to your com-
munity. He is just a foreigner. This was our starting point.
Then we described the logical and historical steps that marked the
evolution of this relationship between ethics and ﬁnance. From outright
opposition to separation and segregation. From the dichotomisation bet-
ween an ordinary ﬁnance and an ethical one, between responsible in-
vestment and investment tout-court, to the establishment of new linka-
ges. Until more recently, a new approach has emerged that places ethics
at the foundation of ﬁnance, not just the “sustainable one”, but any ﬁnance
and all ﬁnance.
We can now turn full circle and go back to where we started. And make
one step forward.
If ﬁnance is not the antithesis of the common good, but on the contrary,
ﬁnance cannot be eﬀective, perform its role, and even exist, without ethics,
without being based on a foundation of ethical principles; then ﬁnance can
also become an instrument of ethics, a tool for making ethics more eﬀec-
tive, a foundation of the gift economy. The world of solidarity and gene-
rosity can, and should rely on the operation of ﬁnancial mechanisms.
From ethics in ﬁnance to ﬁnance in ethics.
26. LeveraGe FOr GOOD: the new FrOntIerS OF SOCIaL InveStment
The world of solidarity and charitable action is undergoing an in-depth
rethinking and is shaken by a wave of innovation and structural change.
60
At the heart of this process of change is the role of ﬁnance bringing new
tools new players and a fundamentally new logic into the working of so-
lidarity intervention.
In his book on Leverage for Good. An Introduction to the New Frontiers
of Philanthropy and Social Investment, Lester Salamon emphatically
speaks of a “signiﬁcant revolution” taking place in the world of charita-
ble initiatives in America, and world-wide.
American philanthropy is in the midst of one of its most turbulent
and interesting transformations in nearly a century. The changing
terrain of charitable giving is evinced by an at-times baffling pro-
liferation of new actors, new tools, and new organizations, challenging
everything from philanthropy’s traditional ways of doing business
to how we think about defining social objectives.
(Salamon 2014).
It amounts – in Salamon’s view – to a new paradigm, a kind of “Big Bang”
of philanthropic innovation and liberalization, that is still in its infancy,
at the stage of the “hundred ﬂowers”, and therefore implies experimen-
tation trial-and-error and the proliferation of a variety of ideas. Moreo-
ver, it is taking place “at the bottom of the pyramid”, following a bottom
up process, rather than being planned and steered from above, and awaits
still a conceptual and normative systematization.
The starting point is the deep unsatisfaction with the eﬀectiveness
and capacity to deliver concrete results of past and present eﬀorts, and
a sense of frustration and deception with the broken promises of many,
albeit well intentioned and strongly motivated do-gooders. This has led
to taking distance from the dominant grant-centric perspective. It is vir-
tually never the case that a stand-alone grant solves the entirety of a so-
cial problem, or allows us to scale impact”; which do most practitioners
normally acknowledge. It also pushes to adopt a problem solving approach
in selecting the tools of intervention, rather than the conventional ad-hoc
piecemeal and supply-driven attitude. It looks for a “more expansive way
of thinking about society’s most intractable problems”, whereby opportu-
nities are expanded and eﬀects are multiplied in a “self-sustaining pro-
cess capable of bringing permanent solutions.”
The way forward has two main features:
ethICS anD FInanCe In SearCh OF a new reLatIOnShIP
61
1. First, a “bewildering array of new instruments and institutions” have
been created: loans, loan guarantees, private equity, social “stock ex-
changes”, bonds and particularly social impact bonds, secondary mar-
kets, securitisation, investment ﬁnds etc. (For an example of an in-
novative proposal, see Bonnici).
2. Philanthropic work has been adapted to “ﬁt into a larger context oc-
cupied by private and public” players. This requires that it becomes “con-
versant in the language and needs of private and public ﬁnance”. Soli-
darity institutions have to operate as “philanthropic banks”.
This new context amounts to a “complex ﬁnance eco-system” that goes
well beyond traditional solidarity mechanisms. Beyond grants. Beyond
traditional foundations, involving a host of new actors, such as capital
aggregators, social enterprise brokers, internet portals etc. Beyond be-
quests: “not simply through the gifts of wealthy individuals, but also from
the privatisation of formerly public or quasi public assets or the establishment
of specialised social purpose investment funds”. Beyond cash: using barter
arrangements, internet capabilities, and in-kind assistance mecha-
nisms.
Leverage is the mechanism that allows limited energy to be translated
into greater power. (…) In the philanthropic world it means (…)
[going beyond] earnings on foundation assets or the annual con-
tributions of individuals to catalyse for social and environmental pur-
poses some portion of the far more enormous investment assets re-
sident in banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual
funds, and the accounts of high net worth individuals.
(ibidem).
The new philanthropy therefore is “more diverse, more entrepreneurial
and investment orientated, more global, and more collaborative”.
The new frontiers of philanthropy engage a broad assortment of pri-
vate financial institutions, including banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, investment advisors, specialised investment funds, and
foundations that function as philanthropic banks.
Finance and leverage give to ethics an extra-gear, greater eﬀectiveness
and – with it – more credibility and a broader appeal. A new paradigm
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of ethical work and solidary has been born. The challenge now is to bring
it from the fringe to the mainstream.
27. the POISOn OF GIFtS: LImItS OF the GIFt eCOnOmy
We are at the beginning of a process of structural transformation. Cer-
tain tools that appeared only recently new and innovative have now be-
come a mature industry: microcredit for instance has been growing ex-
ponentially and looks now capable of mobilising a potential market of $250
billion worldwide. Other tools are under experimentation or have not been
invented yet.
The driving force behind this transformation is the fact that the tra-
ditional mechanisms of social intervention for ﬁghting poverty and buil-
ding cohesion in our communities have proved to be largely unsatisfac-
tory. Large public welfare programmes have become costly and bure-
aucratic. Growth oriented macroeconomic policies have not had an im-
pact capable of trickling down to the beneﬁt of the most vulnerable groups
in society. Modernization and economic progress have brought about ine-
qualities and social decay for those people and communities negatively
aﬀected. It is not surprising therefore that the public sentiment has re-
acted sometimes with cynicism and self-centeredness, a sentiment that
unscrupulous politicians have often exploited to foment populism,
egoism, intolerance and resentment.
Several streams of radical criticism vis-à-vis solidarity approaches have
created a negative environment undermining the commitment to ethics
and the motivation for responsible behaviour. Let me mention a couple
of examples: ﬁrst, the anthropological critique of the gift society, and se-
cond, the debate over the eﬀectiveness of oﬃcial development assistance.
The most stringent and disrupting criticism of the gift exchange, and
of the economic system based on it, comes from the seminal work of an-
thropologists conducted in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. The main au-
thors focusing on the concept and practise of “gift” are the Polish Mali-
nowski and the French Mauss (see more recently Lewis Hyde). These au-
thors conducted original work on the primitive communities of Melanesia
in Papua New Guiney aimed at highlighting the meaning and value of gifts
and their role in traditional societies. Particular attention attracted the
intriguing practise of the “Kula ring”, a gift exchange system studied by
Malinowski whereby the inhabitants of the Trobriand islands would tra-
vel very long distances over dangerous seas simply to give gifts to their
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neighbours without any guarantee of a return. The importance attribu-
ted to gifts and gift exchanges is due to the fact that they play a funda-
mental role in building communities and in establishing and maintaining
social order and relationships. The question is what kind of social order
and what communities are created by the gift economy. Malinowski sho-
wed that the Kula exchange system served to reinforce status and authority
distinctions, since the hereditary chiefs own the most important valua-
bles and assume responsibility for organising the ocean voyages and gift
rituals. There are non-altruistic motives for giving gifts, because even when
formally reciprocity is not expected, substantially an exchange takes pla-
ce in terms of honour and nobility recognition. Relationships nurtured
by gifts are always asymmetrical; the giver has always a higher status than
the receiver. “Pure gifts”, i.e. gifts that do not impose reciprocity, are gi-
ven to preserve landed estates identiﬁed in particular kin groupings and
maintain their places and ranks in the social hierarchy.
Gifts, and solidarity, therefore – according to these studies – are ne-
ver “free”. They always create social bonds with some kind of obligation
to reciprocate. They put people under obligation. This eﬀect, that re-
presents one of the main aim and motivation of the gift exchange, is ge-
nerally referred to as “the poison of gift”. A gift that is not returned, or
is not even expected to be returned, signals inequality of status, depen-
dency, subordination. We may interpret the stigma associated to recei-
ving alimony or being on welfare as coming from there. Correspondin-
gly, an exchange not based on the gift concept, signals independence, ab-
sence of social ties bonds and entitlements, freedom, non-recognition of
the order and values of a community. It characterises therefore a stran-
ger, a foreigner, one that does not belong to the community.
This analytical work can provide the basis for a radical criticism of
the gift economy, and it has been used in that direction. Conversely, it
has highlighted the merits of market exchanges based on the values of
individual freedoms, property rights and equality of all before the law.
However, this contrast and opposition of value-systems has in my view
been carried too far. Reality is much more balanced and harmonious, and
many contributions in the literature support this stance. Indeed, “true gifts”
or non-reciprocal gifts not only are possible, and valuable, in advanced
market economies and democratic societies. But they are widely spread
and recognised. Think for instance of the role plaid by voluntary work
and cooperative partnerships. But doubts have been instilled on the ope-
ration of a gift economy, and awareness has been raised on the possible
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limits of traditional solidarity. Theoretical, or worse ideological con-
frontation have to be replaced by concrete, informed and evidence ba-
sed analysis.
28. In SearCh OF a thIrD way
Between PrIvate CharIty anD PUBLIC weLFare
A second example of criticism of interventions motivated by solidarity
can be drawn from the debate over Oﬃcial Development Assistance and
its impact on poverty and underdevelopment. In his iconoclastic and wi-
dely acclaimed book “The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Ad-
ventures and Misadventures in the Tropics”, William Easterly reviewed
critically the eﬀorts by Western Governments to pour aid and ﬁll the ﬁ-
nancing gap to invest in the developing world. Conditionality imposed
on third World countries policies did not work. There was little incenti-
ve for recipient Governments to improve their policies. Debt forgiveness
regimes produced the same moral hazard, as authoritarian Gover-
nments considered forgiveness as a free pass to continue to steal from their
peoples’ future. Easterly suggested that aid should be tied to prior achie-
vement rather than promises of political leaders. In The While Man’s Bur-
den (the title refers to Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem celebrating
American imperialism) Easterly criticised the campaigns of development
cooperation agencies and international organisations in favour of foreign
aid, and people like Bono and Bob Geldof that spent their reputation on
them. Such messianic do-good missions – Easterly believes – are ultimately
modern reincarnations of the infamous colonial conceit of yore. The sub-
title of the book is self-explanatory: “Why the West’s Eﬀorts to Aid the
Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”. In the later essay The
Tyranny of Experts: Economists Dictators and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor,
Easterly chastise development policies focused on expert advice and eco-
nomic subsidies for failing to address the core of the problem, that is the
lack of individual rights. Developed countries often sided with abusive
autocrats by lauding their economic presumed achievements and igno-
ring their dismal human rights records.
Another economist, author of best-selling books is worth mentioning
in this context: Dambisa Mojo. In her highly popular book Dead Aid: Why
Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa, she focuses
on Africa arguing that intergovernmental aid had harmed Africa and
should be phased out. The Financial Times summarizes the book’s ar-
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gument, stating “Limitless development assistance to African governments
has fostered dependency, encouraged corruption and ultimately perpe-
tuated poor governance and poverty”. World Bank economist Paul Col-
lier in a review of the book stated “Aid is not a very potent instrument for
enhancing either security or accountability. Our obsession with it has de-
tracted from the more important ways in which we can promote deve-
lopment: peacekeeping, security guarantees, trade privileges, and go-
vernance”.
These radical critiques prompted a heated academic and political de-
bate. The most prominent defender of foreign aid and supporter of the
view that more development assistance is needed to improve conditions
in developing countries, most noticeably in Africa, is Jeﬀrey Sachs. In his
book The End of Poverty he argues that only through carefully planned
development aid extreme poverty can be eliminated, deﬁning even the
target date globally of 2025. Sach’s analysis lent support to the UN Su-
stainable Development Goals programs that was agreed upon by the lea-
ders of the main countries at the UN Millennium summit ﬁrst, and later
restated and relaunched at the 2015 Summit in New York. His calcula-
tions showed that if developed countries stick to their commitment to in-
vest in foreign aid 0.7% of their GDP, this would be suﬃcient to eradi-
cate extreme poverty al-together by the target date. He obviously criti-
cised Easterly and Mojo for providing an alibi to reluctant western Go-
vernments to comply with their promises and invest in development. Asked
for his views on Dead Aid, Bill Gates stated “Books like that – they are pro-
moting evil”.
In a paper published in 2007 with Abdur Chowdhury, I proposed more
balanced and mid-way point of view on the issue of the eﬀectiveness of
oﬃcial development assistance, drawing lessons from the European ex-
perience. Economic integration and subsidiarity provide the conditions
necessary for ODA to produce higher rates of economic growth on a su-
stainable basis. The experience of Eastern European transition countries,
provides an excellent case in point. These countries were assisted by the
European Union in their eﬀorts to integrate their economies with those
of Western Europe and adopt bold economic reforms conducive to growth.
The focus then in the discussion should not be on whether… or…, but
rather on at what conditions development aid can be eﬀective.
To conclude, “all that glitters is not gold” in the world of solidarity.
And new glitters are coming from the world of ﬁnance in search of a clo-
ser and more appropriate relationship with ethics. The time is ripe for ex-
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ploring a third way approach between private charity and public welfa-
re, both of which have shown limitations, even though it would be inap-
propriate to think that they could be simply scrapped. The new rappro-
chement between ethics and ﬁnance and the new and promising terms
of their relationship enable to create an environment conducive to social
experimentation, innovation and best practise.
For all people of good will there is precious and hard work to do.
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The relationship between ethics and ﬁnance is quite complex and can be
addressed from diﬀerent perspectives. I see at least three aspects worth
investigating:
• the ﬁrst is if the principles of business ethics have a speciﬁc applica-
tion in the ﬁnancial sector;
• the second is how ethical principles steer the decision of ﬁnancial ac-
tors in relation to the purpose of debtors’ (borrowers or investees) eco-
nomic activities;
• the third (on which I will focus more) is to what extent ethics inﬂuence
society’s preferences and become a competitive factor for debtors in
the market.
1. Like in any other business environment, moral or ethical problems ari-
se from time to time and professionals have to deal with them, both at
individual and organisational level. One might argue that in an over-re-
gulated sector such as ﬁnance, it’s the law that states what is right and
what is wrong and, therefore, an organization that behaves in compliance
with law is on the safe side. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. We know
that law and contracts are incomplete. There is always room for expec-
tancies that cannot be regulated by formal rules. In this grey area that
law cannot cover, it is ethics that is supposed to guide decisions.
The business of ﬁnance is particularly sensitive to conﬂict of interests.
Insider trading is a classic. But let’s take a very ordinary case, such as len-
ding, and let’s apply it in one of the noblest example of business driven
by values, the cooperative banks: here, the principle of mutuality, the in-
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ternal democracy, the [theoretical] alignment of interests of diﬀerent sta-
keholders (a person can be at the same time shareowner (member of the
cooperative), client (both depositor and borrower), employee and
member of the board) can create either a magic formula or a complete
mess – and it’s ethics that makes the diﬀerence, not the rule of law.
Another example comes from the news about the role of banks in tax
evasion that emerged from the Panama Papers: one of the most respec-
ted Nordic ﬁnancial institutions, Nordea, has been alleged to have hel-
ped some of its clients to hide their wealth. The bank regretted that it did
have procedures earlier to ensure clients pay the necessary taxes and its
CEO added “Compliance is the bank’s absolute top priority”. Still, Den-
mark’s minister for culture and ecclesiastical aﬀairs, Bertel Haarder, said
“ethical conduct will be an important competitive parameter in the fu-
ture. It won’t be enough that a transaction is legal. It also needs to be mo-
rally defensible.” This statement clearly demonstrates that compliance
with law is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition to run a business. In
order to achieve the licence to operate, a company must do more than
respect the basics; it has to move beyond and to fulﬁl the legitimate ex-
pectations that come from the society.
For banks and ﬁnancial institutions in general, social legitimacy is par-
ticularly hard to achieve. Historically, lenders do not have a good repu-
tation. The practice of making money with money (as opposed by ear-
ning it through labour) has always been very controversial and many re-
ligions disapprove interests on lending. In more recent times, the big cri-
sis that (symbolically) started with Lehman Bros bankrupt has been at-
tributed to the opportunistic behaviour of Wall Street greedy bankers. Cle-
arly, it is a rough simpliﬁcation – but it witnesses how long is the way that
ﬁnancial institutions have to walk to regain public conﬁdence.
In this perspective, codes of ethics are perceived as a further level of
regulation that create smoke rather than provide an eﬃcient and credi-
ble tool to prevent misconducts. Instead, I believe that they are one of the
most eﬀective means that ﬁnancial institutions have to regain trust: ack-
nowledging the existence of conﬂicts and clearly stating how they are trea-
ted is the basis of the social contract with stakeholders. Companies (and
ﬁnancial institutions make no exception) tend to make very general sta-
tements on the importance of their stakeholders, i.e. that they are all equal-
ly esteemed: the organisation wants to create value for shareholders and
customers and employees and communities and future generations and
(…) – which is simply impossible: every person with common sense knows
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that in any organisation some stakeholders are more important than
others, even if it might be politically incorrect to admit. But not to say who
is more important than who just generates the conditions for arbitrari-
ness and ambiguity – that is exactly what an organization should avert.
Codes of ethics are not there to create verbose and useless superﬂuity and
to make things more complicated – exactly the opposite: an honest code
of ethics helps people to solve problems. It’s not by denying the existence
of ethical dilemmas that organisations can overtake tangles, but rather
by dealing with them with transparency and frankness.
2. What I said above might concern, mutatis mutandis, any business. But
in terms of applied ethics, the ﬁnancial industry has a peculiarity that po-
ses speciﬁc questions, which is that its impacts are mainly indirect. Finance
is an enabler for someone else’s business – that, in turn, generates economic,
social and environmental eﬀects. It is not the ﬁnancial activity itself that
emits, say, greenhouse gases, but banks’ corporate customers might do. The
question then is: is the bank responsible of the consequences of its custo-
mers’ activities? Legally speaking, in most cases the answer is not. But, as
we learned, compliance with legal standards is not enough. The ethical prin-
ciple of responsibility suggests that one should consider also the reper-
cussions of the activities it makes possible. And, in fact, ﬁnancial institu-
tions are bitterly criticised for supporting companies that run controver-
sial businesses (armaments, alcohol, pornography …) or manage a “nor-
mal” business in way that undermines social or human or environmental
capital (for example, violation of human rights along the value chain).
This debate is at the origin of what we call “ethical ﬁnance”, i.e. a par-
ticular way to act as a ﬁnancial institution that is steered by an ethical pur-
pose. An ethical bank does not ﬁnance any business whatsoever, but only
those that produce outputs in line with its values. In other words, ethi-
cal ﬁnance expresses a clear view of the society it wants to pursue. Its mis-
sion is to make it real by funding only the economic actors who share this
vision. The real innovation of ethical ﬁnance is that it overcomes the idea
of “neutrality” of ﬁnancial activity and extends to the capital supplier the
responsibility for the eﬀects of the underlying business. Finance is not a
goal itself, but a mean. The social legitimation of ﬁnance is not given for
granted; it needs to be justiﬁed by the extent to which it contributes to
the achievement of an ethical economy.
Of course, we know that the concept of ethics is relative, not abso-
lute. Ethics is a system of moral rules that are recognised by a homoge-
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neous community. When we speak of ethical ﬁnance, we should always
clarify which ethics we are referring to. Catholic ethics diﬀers from Isla-
mic one – but both are applied by ﬁnancial institutions that deﬁne them-
selves as ethical. If we push the concept up to the extreme, also maﬁa ex-
presses an ethical vision (a set of stringent rules, fully respected by its mem-
bers) and its ﬁnancial activity is ethical in the sense that it is coherent with
the maﬁa values (maximisation of proﬁts at any cost, code of silence…)
– but it is clearly a paradox.
3. We are witnessing a vast phenomenon of change in moral values in the
society. After years when economic growth was perceived as the only goal,
worth any social cost, today people feel that a new balance has to be found
in the economic system and in the society. People’s new awareness, rai-
sed by social and environmental crises, generates eﬀects in several di-
rections: citizens-voters push their representatives in the political arena
to pass more stringent regulations – that, in turn, penalize (or reward)
corporates’ social or environmental policies; citizens-consumers use their
purchasing power (the so-called ‘vote with the wallet’) and determine the
success of companies’ business strategies; citizens-employees transfer their
values in the organisations they work for, promoting the change from the
inside. Like a tide, the new social sensitivity instils the seeds of change
at any level.
Finance is not immune to this development – and Sustainable and Re-
sponsible Investment (SRI) is possibly the phenomenon that better syn-
thetises it.
SRI consists in the integration of Environmental, Social and Gover-
nance (ESG) issues in the investment processes. This means that inve-
stors, when deciding asset allocation, not only consider the economic fun-
damentals (solidity, proﬁtability…) of investees, but also the quality of
their ESG policies and practices. In practice, this happens through the use
of a set of indicators that measure how the invested company manages
the relationships with its key stakeholders (shareholders, employees, cu-
stomers, communities, suppliers…).
SRI can take diﬀerent shapes, according to the goals that the inve-
stor wants to achieve. Eurosif, the European reference organisation in this
domain, deﬁnes seven possible approaches1:
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• Sustainability themed investments cover a wide range of themes from
climate change and energy eﬃciency to for – ests and water. Investors’
motivations may vary greatly, but it is typical to support particular
industries transitioning to more sustainable consumption and pro-
duction. This can be combined with a belief that a particular theme
will outperform the rest of the market over the holding period, or may
provide some degree of de-correlation to other investments.
• Best-in-Class assets typically involve selecting the top percentage of
companies within a sector using ESG criteria. For example, within the
consumer goods sector, in companies eligible for portfolio selection,
a portfolio manager might restrict the investable universe to the top
50% based on an ESG rating screen. The relative allocation to the por-
tfolio of the selected companies may then depend on purely ﬁnan-
cial criteria, but can also be made using a combination of ﬁnancial
and ESG analysis. Other Best-in-Class methods also exist (e.g. Best-
in-Universe, Best-in-Eﬀort), and the strategy is also referred to as po-
sitive screening.
• Norms-based screening is a strategy that involves assessing each com-
pany held in the investment portfolio against speciﬁc standards of ESG
performance. These standards are based on international norms set
by organisations or institutions such as the United Nations Global Com-
pact (UNGC), the OECD Guide-lines for Multinational Corporations
and International Treaties. Investors will often use one or a combi-
nation of these standards, or they may construct their own standard
based on these initiatives. Once companies in the portfolio have been
identiﬁed in breach of these standards, investors will perform a dee-
per analysis and take action. This action typically falls into two ca-
tegories: exclusion from portfolio or engagement with companies.
• Exclusions or negative screening is a strategy that involves removing
companies or sectors from the investible universe of the portfolio. The-
re are a number of diﬀerent motivations and applications of this stra-
tegy, from risk management to values-based investing (moral, ethi-
cal or mission-based requirements). The exclusion of certain con-
troversial activities is becoming common among European investors.
This often includes those prohibited by international conventions, such
as the 1997 Ottawa convention on anti-personnel landmines and the
2008 Oslo convention on cluster munitions.
• ESG integration is deﬁned as the explicit inclusion by asset managers
of ESG risks and opportunities into traditional ﬁnancial analysis and
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investment decisions based on a systematic process and appropria-
te research sources. This strategy can be further articulated into three
sub-types:
- non systematic ESG Integration, when ESG research and analy-
ses made available to mainstream analysts and fund managers;
- systematic consideration/inclusion of ESG research/analyses in
ﬁnancial ratings/valuations by analysts and fund managers;
- mandatory investment constraints based on ﬁnancial ra-
tings/valuations derived from ESG research/ analyses (exclusions,
under-weighting etc.).
• Engagement and voting on ESG issues, driven in large part by the view
that shareholders are stewards of assets who are accountable to their
beneﬁciaries for how they manage those assets. Policymakers and other
stakeholders are propagating this view through initiatives like Ste-
wardship Codes and legislation such as the EU Shareholder Rights
Directive.
Despite the diﬃculties in understanding such a fast-evolving market, all
studies demonstrate that SRI, however deﬁned and applied, is gaining
momentum and it is growing in terms of size and quality. The undispu-
table success of SRI can is explained by at least two reasons – that, in fact,
are two sides of the same coin: market demand and solid business case.
The former is easier to interpret: like in many other sectors, consu-
mers’ preference is moving towards products and services that are per-
ceived as ‘sustainable’ – whatever the ﬁnal client intends with it. People
more and more buy organic food, child labour free garments, hybrid ve-
hicles, eco-certiﬁed travels and so forth. Of course, savers do not buy a
mutual fund exactly with the same logic the use for a fairtrade banana,
because the social dimension of ﬁnance, as said earlier, is indirect and
therefore less immediate to catch (not surprisingly, SRI more diﬀused
amongst the highly educated and conscious targets). It will take a whi-
le to move from the niche to the mass market, but it is only a matter of
time.
SRI is in minimal part driven by retail investors. The vast majority of
SRI assets come from institutionals. Why do they go for SRI, provided that
they don’t have to fulﬁl an intimate moral imperative? The answer brings
us to the latter reason of the success of SRI: it works. Empirical eviden-
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ce from a huge bulk of academic studies shows that there is a positive cor-
relation between ESG and ﬁnancial performance. This statement would
require a lot of reasoning and statistics to be accepted and this is not the
place where to do this exercise. But, to remain on the ground of intuition,
we can aﬃrm that the more a corporate strategy is aligned with socie-
ty’s values, the more is likely to achieve success. From this viewpoint, ha-
ving a good ESG score means being able to prevent [market, legal and
reputational] risks and to catch the opportunities created by the new de-
mand of sustainable products and services. In a word, because sustai-
nability is the new competitive factor for success, sustainable companies
are less risky and eventually more proﬁtable. Institutional investors do-
n’t go for SRI because they are good in a moral perspective, but becau-
se, by doing so, they protect their assets and fulﬁl their ﬁduciary duty to-
wards their clients.
Now, going back to the initial questions, what is the relation betwe-
en SRI and ethics? Is it really diﬀerent from what we called ‘ethical ﬁ-
nance’? My answer would be that the purpose of SRI is not ethical – or
not necessarily. But ethics, in a way, is what makes SRI possible: in a rough
simpliﬁcation, ethics is what people feel is right or wrong. If, in a given
social context, polluting the atmosphere with greenhouse gases is per-
ceived as ‘bad’, those companies that do not reduce their impact will be
considered as anti-societal; their licence to operate will be questioned.
In this sense, there is a convergence between economic interest and so-
cietal interest. An ethical conduct can be economically sensible becau-
se is rewarded by the society (and vice-versa). Ethical behaviour is con-
venient – but behave ethically because is convenient is not ethical. What
makes an [economic] action morally valuable is its purpose: the same ac-
tion has a diﬀerent moral value depending on the aim for which it is ta-
ken.
Here lies the distinction between a [responsible] for-proﬁt business
and a social business: the former’s mission is to maximise proﬁts and it
will take into consideration other stakeholders’ interests to the extent in
which it creates value that can be, directly or indirectly, monetized; the
latter is there to create social value and it is driven by intrinsic motiva-
tions. In times of crisis, the former will compress any investment that aﬀects
proﬁtability; the latter will reduce margins, but will try to preserve so-
cial value creation. In other words, the former considers ethics as a con-
straint in its objective function; the latter looks at moral goods as a goal
to pursue.

Wealth creation and with it the ﬁnancial system and social justice are of-
ten perceived at best as separate – at worst as in opposition. This actually
forgets the role that the ﬁnancial system has had historically in the be-
ginning as a way of democratising access to wealth, but this is indeed the
view, which has become predominant.
The way the two are often reconciled is by putting the focus on the ex-
tent to which wealth creation can create more resources that can be redi-
stributed. And the traditional instrument for that – as the previous speaker
mentioned – was the taxation system. But this understanding, in opposi-
tion or at best as strictly separated of wealth creation on the one hand and
on the other hand of social value, of social infrastructure has shaped the un-
derstanding of the relationship between the two domains. An understan-
ding governed by diﬀerent set of values and pursuing diﬀerent goals.
This tension has been clearly exacerbated by the ﬁnancial crisis and
the perception that this crisis was linked to inadequate set of values, to
a world deprived of ethics and appropriate behaviour.
In my view – and this is the ﬁrst point I want to make – this tension
feeds and is fed by a deeper challenge to the foundation of the social con-
tract on which our societies, our States have been based and worked for
decades.
There are two main origins for this deeper challenge to this social con-
tract.
The ﬁrst one is globalisation. Globalisation is perceived as redistri-
buting wealth between diﬀerent set of actors. Mobility for example is ea-
sier for capital than it is for individuals and in that way then having re-
distributive eﬀects altering the social contract by virtue of the consequences
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redeﬁning the social contract
mIGUeL POIareS maDUrO*
* Former Minister for Regional Development, Portugal.
of globalisation. And globalisation is also perceived as aﬀecting the au-
tonomy of State political communities in regulating and distributing the
wealth as part of that social contract. So, globalisation puts in question
the traditional forum for the governing of the social relationships that are
part of that social contract.
The second deeper challenge for that social contract is linked to a va-
riety of structural challenges in our society such as ageing but, I would say,
the crucial element for the future in terms of those societal structural chan-
ges and the way that it will aﬀect our social contract is the technological
revolution. This technological revolution is having and will have extremely
important and relevant redistributive impacts. First, because the nature
of innovation today and the nature of technological innovation and the
products and services that it creates is such that added value in these new
products and new services is often very strongly concentrated. And that
strong concentration therefore has an impact on equality and has profound
redistributive consequences. Second, robotics, artiﬁcial intelligence is bound
to profoundly impact the nature of employment. Some recent studies esti-
mate that 50% of all jobs that we currently have, 70% of low skilled jobs,
will be replaced in a period of 10 to 20 years. I will argue that this set of
conditions – globalisation, the structural challenges, the technological re-
volution – puts us in a situation very similar to that which we historical-
ly faced when we had the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution
had profound societal consequences and the way to legitimate, to ac-
commodate these consequences was the emergence of the Welfare Sta-
te. The Welfare State was the answer to the challenge that we historical-
ly faced with the industrial revolution. So what we need today is to de-
sign and to ﬁnd what is our answer to this profound challenge which we
have in societal terms. In my view, the fundamental part of that answer
will come from impact investment. And I believe so because a fundamental
part of that answer will need to come from breaking this separation bet-
ween wealth creation on the one hand and social justice on the other. This
can be then by instruments that will internalise social values, social go-
als in the operation of the ﬁnancial system and the market economy.
This can be also by pulling on the power of innovation, also not only
at the level of products and services but also on the level of public poli-
cies. It is in this context that I said that I believe social innovation and im-
pact investment can play a fundamental role.
This is what we try to do in Portugal, by developing a very ambitious
social innovation and impact investment program. Our program for so-
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cial innovation is the ﬁrst one also where EU structural funds are being
used, is probably in relative terms the most ambitious worldwide.
But in my view it’s not enough to have funds, to put money. For this
to work, for social innovation to succeed and to deliver what we expect
and want it to deliver, we need to change institutional culture. Infra-
structure is important, funds are important, people are important, but
it is crucial to change our institutional culture, what is often described
as the ecosystem. We need an ecosystem that is friendly to innovation,
that welcomes and understands impact investment and integrates the set
of values that is linked to it.
But the creation of this ecosystem, the change in institutional culture,
is perhaps also the most diﬃcult thing to achieve because we are cultu-
rally dependent. We have sort of cultural bias on how we understand the
world. And therefore one of the most diﬃcult things for those who work
on social innovation, on impact investment is to make the others un-
derstand its potential because often the potential is understandable only
when it is lived. We do not have that reality yet, it is diﬃcult for those to
anticipate the potential of something which is totally foreign, stranger
to how things have usually been done.
I would like to make a small exercise with you, to try to make this point
clear.
Imagine you are in the year 2000 and you have two groups of peo-
ple that come to you asking to fund a project. The ﬁrst is a group of very
famous professors come and say well we are going to create the best en-
cyclopaedia in the world. It is going to surpass the Britannia encyclopaedia,
it’s going to surpass Larousse, it’s going be the best encyclopaedia in the
world because we have the best professors. We have agreements with Har-
vard, with Yale, with Sorbonne, with La Sapienza, with all the best uni-
versities in the world and these people are going to write the entries and
the best encyclopaedia you can think of.
And then comes the second group of people, likely younger people,
that come to asking for ﬁnancing tool. Remember, this is the year 2000.
You ask “What do you want us to fund?”. They reply “We want to crea-
te an encyclopaedia. It’s going to be a site on the Internet. Everyone can
create an entry, everyone can come and edit that entry and write wha-
tever they want”.
Who do you think will be funded? The ﬁrst group, because that was
our concept of encyclopaedia. The second is what we call Wikipedia and
has become the dominant concept of an encyclopaedia. But until Wiki-
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pedia existed, if you would tell anyone mainstream to fund, to put lots
of money in it, nobody would have done it because that was not the con-
cept of what an encyclopaedia would be.
This tells us a lesson about the nature of innovation, including social
innovation, about the extent of obstacles in terms of path dependency,
of cultural bias that need to be overcome. And in order to overcome them
what we really need is a holistic approach that works at the level of dif-
ferent institutional variables in order to create the institutional cultural
change that we need to set up the ecosystem that is friendly to social in-
novation and impact investment.
There are decisive elements in this ecosystem. You need more coo-
perative mentality to ﬁght the silus culture that is dominant in the pu-
blic sector, but is also dominant in the way that companies work. You need
a cooperative mentality. Specialisation is great but increasingly you need
to balance that better with cooperation. You need more openness to ex-
perimentation and risk-taking. You need a more meritocratic culture, more
focus on measurable results and metrics to assess them. And you need
– as the previous speaker also mentioned – much more focus on a smal-
ler scale, on decentralisation. The idea is that you can succeed in areas
of innovation by starting with a smaller scale, then generalising then ex-
panding it.
It is with this in mind that in Portugal we created our social innovation
program and in that program we stressed a lot the instruments that aim
at promoting cooperation between actors but also more integrated go-
vernance. We also stress very much capacitation, very strong emphasis on
that. Also tremendous importance is given to developing new metrics, de-
veloping measurable indicators and that in an area such as social innova-
tion and impact investment is a novelty because you don’t measure results
simply by market return, but because you want to measure other positive
externalities which are created, how do you measure that ﬁnancially?
This is a crucial working where we have to invest much more. And
our program also has a tremendous focus both on scalability and su-
stainability. It has four pillars in this respect.
The ﬁrst one is what we call capacity building for social investment.
We give grants of up to 50.000 EUR to each actor who has a project fun-
ded. This money can be used only for capacitation. So the idea is that with
the money to fund a project comes a speciﬁc funding that is only to be
used for capacitation, to strengthen the managerial capacity, to prepa-
re these actors to receive the impact investment.
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The second pillar is what we call venture philanthropy matching pro-
gram. The purpose here is to promote a pipeline of stronger and more su-
stainable projects. Basically what we do here is we match the founding
that comes from foundation, corporations and also other public entities,
that are provided for impact initiatives in a logic of venture philanthro-
py. And the idea is to grow the critical mass of these projects, to then al-
low them to be in a better position to beneﬁt from the additional two pil-
lars that we have in our program, that are the most substantial.
So these ﬁrst two are meant to reinforce the capacity of the system to
then receive and make use of the two most important instruments. The-
se two most important instruments are one related to innovation on pu-
blic policies. And it is the social impact bonds. The State or public entities
contract with NGOs but can also be private companies, can also be local
authorities and often what we have the indication from the ﬁrst project
is that you have a consortium of local authorities and NGOs. Aimed for
example at reducing academic failure, drop out rates from school. And what
our program does is that, it measures the beneﬁt, the social beneﬁt from
the reduction in the drop out rate. This is given a certain value, which is
measurable in ﬁnancial terms; and if that goal is achieved by that program,
the State through our program pays to the investors who have an economic
return, an economic proﬁt from the investment they have made in pur-
suing that social goal. So this social impact bonds is the instrument that
we have in promoting innovation in public policies. And our expectation
is that these projects will be multiple, but on a smaller scale, often at lo-
cal level. And where a project such as that will work in the area of edu-
cation, but we also have other areas such as health, employment, social
inclusion, then can be generalised for other areas of the country.
The fourth and ﬁnal pillar that we have is the fund for social inno-
vation. This is actually the ﬁrst ﬁnancial instrument for social innovation
set up with means of the European Union structural fund. This fund will
work at the wholesale level. In the form of equity or partial equity or ﬁ-
nancing of loans. Through entities that can be banks, can be foundations
and often again what we see here is that there are groups forming with
banks, foundations, NGOs, social actors, that they will be the retail en-
tities that will contract with Portugal Social Innovation and will provi-
de funds in terms of impact investment.
Now, these are the four pillars through which we try to cover the full
range of potential that we have in the area of social innovation and im-
pact investment.
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But it’s not enough to set up an ambitious program like this one. We
have many challenges that we have ahead, many challenges that we have
not only at the level of my own country, Portugal, but also Europe. I trust
tremendously in the potential of social innovation and impact investment.
And I trust very much in this potential to help us addressing the challenges
that we have in reconstructing the conditions for the social contract that
have been the basis of our society.
But I want to conclude highlighting some of the challenges and the
risks that we have implementing this strategy.
The ﬁrst are political risks. I was a politician for some years so I am
well aware of what you have to gain or to lose in investing on a topic like
this. This is reason for me why politicians very rarely, particularly in Eu-
rope, have not assumed ownership of the idea of social innovation and
impact investment. It hasn’t been given by politicians often the impor-
tance. You have certainly the United Kingdom and the United States, but
outside these two countries very rarely it has been taken as a ﬂag, as so-
mething that could be politically valuable. And you need politicians to
think that it is politically valuable for them to assume ownership and lead
and pursue this agenda.
And for me the reason is the complexity. It is very diﬃcult to explain
this to people. The advantages, the consequences… What does it mean
to internalise in the economy social goals? What does it mean exactly so-
cial innovation? What does it mean impact investment? It is not some-
thing that you can go to a television and present in a thirty seconds sta-
tement. And in fact, if you say “I give 150 million to traditional in the form
of subsidies to social actors” you can get, but if you say “I give 150 mil-
lion to social innovation and impact investment, it’s going to be levera-
ged by ﬁnancial institution and used to support projects that will produce
social goods” that’s more diﬃcult to understand.
This complexity means it is diﬃcult to sell but moreover it means so-
mething else too. It means it is very easy to manipulate. In Portugal, when
we presented this, either we have almost no attention from the media or,
when we have, is because someone started to say “Oh, this is the begin-
ning of a privatisation, this is a new form of privatisation” And that’s it.
You have the label privatisation and immediately you are in trouble. So,
the ﬁrst challenge that we have is how to sell it politically. How to make
it politically attractive. And this should be the focus of those that work
on this agenda. And I think the goal, the starting point is this. What we
say is that we want to create a market economy that is more socially frien-
SOCIaL InnOvatIOn anD ImPaCt InveStment84
dly. That’s the starting point that acts more in accordance with social va-
lues, that’s how to pursue this agenda politically.
The second challenge that we have is competition with traditional are-
as such as philanthropy or the way in which traditionally social actors have
played.
In the beginning in Portugal we had many suspicions, reservations
from traditional social actors. This is a new area, is not the way we tra-
ditionally do things where you got the subsidy to produce a certain so-
cial service. The idea of sustainability of a social project is contradicto-
ry of the idea how they are perceived. You get money to provide a ser-
vice. You don’t get money to produce something which then gives you a
ﬁnancial return. So, the risks of division, of competition of those who say
“No, we shouldn’t invest in philanthropy, we shouldn’t invest in impact
investment” is a very strong one.
And here, again, the focus has to be that these two things are not in
opposition they are complementary. Social innovation and impact in-
vestment have a plus compared to other traditional areas. They are a sy-
stem to mainstream social values into all areas of the economy, including
when you act for proﬁt.
The third challenge is demand. I often say in Portugal “we have no pro-
blem in funding”. My fear is, do we have projects with the quality necessary
that will justify the funding to be provided? Or do we have investors rea-
dy to come with their money to make use of these new ﬁnancial instruments?
This is basically the challenge resulting from the fact that we are creating
a new market where it does not exist. And therefore the focus that we have
put in Portugal in terms of capacitation and in terms of creating a set of ac-
tors that we call activation actors, not to be passive but to be proactive in
the search fro example to help the traditional circle of social actors t make
use of these new possibilities. Because there is a lot of potential from which
you can pull but you need to reform and to capacitate those actors.
And very important in this respect – this leads me to my ﬁnal point –
is visibility. As said, social innovation, impact investment often is on a smal-
ler scale, should start on a smaller scale. But on the other hand, in order
to be successful in facing the challenges that I mentioned, it needs to be
part and be supported by a broad narrative. In my view, and this is the point
that I tried to make at the beginning, this narrative is and could be the role
that social innovation and impact investment can have in allowing us to
face the challenges for the social contract, in terms allowing us to rebuild
the social contract on which society has been founded. Thank you very much.
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Global corporations – and in particular, those in the ﬁnancial services sec-
tor – face a broadening wave of public scrutiny and a rising level of socie-
tal expectations. According to the 2015 Edelman Trust Barometer, ﬁnan-
cial services and banking remain among the least trusted industries wor-
ldwide in the eyes of the public – placing it below the chemicals, pharma-
ceuticals and energy industries. In the United States, Occupy Wall Street and
other protest movements sought to bring public attention and reform to what
they identiﬁed as a leading contributor to social and economic inequality.
Banks are still recovering from the loss of trust and faith resulting from
the global ﬁnancial crisis. During a time when the ﬁnancial services sec-
tor continues to recover and works to rebuild its reputation, restoring and
strengthening public conﬁdence and trust is essential to the future of the
global ﬁnancial system.
The public understands well that we are all stakeholders of the de-
cisions and actions taken within large, powerful ﬁnancial institutions; and
that these decisions have the ability to aﬀect our lives – for good and for
ill – whether we are customers or not. Core to Citi’s mission and values
is a commitment to responsible ﬁnance and stewardship, which informs
our culture of ethics that drive how we operate, conduct business and lead
at Citi.
1. BeGInnInG at the LeveL OF the COrPOratIOn
For Citi, as for all ﬁnancial institutions, trust is the necessary foundation
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fectively do our jobs without the ability to maintain the conﬁdence and
trust of the people, communities, and institutions we serve. Citi has a num-
ber of internal and external processes in place and additional eﬀorts un-
derway that mirror many of the recommendations of Fondazione Cen-
tesimus Annus Pro Pontiﬁce’s (FCAPP) report entitled, “The Dublin Pro-
posals on Finance and the Common Good”.
Citi’s Chief Executive Oﬃcer, Michael Corbat, has led and increased
our corporate-wide campaign to reinforce Citi’s culture of ethics and trust
in how we serve stakeholders by building a globally-consistent approach
to ethics training and setting global standards for business practices. At
every level of the business, we work with our employees to meet and ex-
ceed the highest standards of ethical behavior at all times, operating with
integrity, honesty and transparency. To instill this value and expectation
in the workplace, Citi’s CEO and senior leadership frequently reiterate
corporate ethics values to employees. In addition, Citi employees recei-
ve training workshops, access to an array of resources, and incentives that
enable them to act with integrity. At the same time, we encourage our
employees to raise concerns if they encounter a task or activity that se-
ems at odds with our values. We have a number of mechanisms that ena-
ble Citi employees to report questionable or inappropriate conduct of pe-
ers and managers without fear of reprisal.
Our commitment to fostering a culture of ethical decision-making
begins with the values outlined in our Code of Conduct, we ask our em-
ployees and all those who work on Citi’s behalf to meet three tests in ma-
king decisions: 1) that they be in the clients’ interests; 2) create economic
value; and 3) are always systemically responsible. First published in 1997,
the Board-approved Code functions as an ethical guide for Citi’s global
workforce. The Code sets forth the values and principles that direct our
conduct when dealing with clients, business colleagues, shareholders,
communities and each other. It demonstrates Citi’s commitment to a cul-
ture of ethics and integrity and applies to all of our corporate directors,
oﬃcers and employees. The Code is available to the public and publi-
shed in 26 languages, covering a broad range of topics including: Con-
ﬂicts of Interest, Fair Employment Practices and Diversity, Safeguarding
Personal, Proprietary and Conﬁdential Information, Anti-Money Laun-
dering Compliance, Commitment to Sustainability, Commitment to Hu-
man Rights and Responsibility to Raise Ethical Issues. All new emplo-
yees must acknowledge that they have read, understood and agreed to
comply with the Code of Conduct, and we ask that they reaﬃrm this com-
InternaLLy-DrIven ethICaL reCOnStrUCtIOn88
89
mitment periodically through mandated trainings conducted on a regular
basis.
In addition, individuals performing services for Citi may be subject
to comply with the Code by contract or agreement. In 2014, we revised
our Code training courses for all employees and non-employees. The Code
training course aims to reinforce understanding of our principles, values
and standards of professional behavior across our workforce, helping em-
ployees become familiar with and act in accordance with Citi’s policies
and procedures. It also provides an overview of certain key legal and re-
gulatory requirements.
The Code of Conduct is powerful, indispensable in guiding how we
conduct our business. It does more than simply establish rules or dicta-
te the behaviors that we expect of our employees. It is equally important
to empower employees, support their courage and provide mechanisms
that enable them to fulﬁll those expectations. The Code provides a detailed
guide to the structures and processes that Citi has put into place to detect,
collect and address incidents that may pose a legal or reputational risk to
the bank. As previously mentioned, Citi has procedures and resources avai-
lable to employees who may encounter potentially unethical situations at
work. The Code also outlines those resources and oﬀers speciﬁc guidan-
ce about how to raise any concerns in a safe and eﬃcient manner with the
designated entities within Citi – such as Compliance Oﬃcers – that are able
to address or escalate those concerns for resolution.
To underscore the importance of and reinforce ethical standards and
behaviors, Citi, with the oversight of our Board’s Ethics and Culture Com-
mittee, developed and championed a company-wide ethics and culture
campaign. Launched in 2014, the global initiative included:
- In-person trainings for nearly 5,000 of our most senior managers to
foster ethical decision-making and underscore the importance of esca-
lating issues. Citi has recently updated and rolled-out this training
to some 40,000 additional senior employees, globally.
- Updates to the internal Citi Ethics Oﬃce website, providing emplo-
yees with easier access to resources, including an ethical decision-
making tool, the Code of Conduct, and methods to report concerns.
- A new video series focused on ethics featuring insights and illustra-
tive examples from Citi’s senior management team. All employees can
access and replay these videos via multiple distribution channels, in-
cluding internal email and the employee website.
- A Conduct Risk Program to assess and manage the risks associated
with any inappropriate conduct of employees and agents that can lead
to negative outcomes for consumers, clients, and ﬁnancial markets.
2. meetInG reGULatOry exPeCtatIOnS
anD externaL StaKehOLDer enGaGement
We also conduct business in compliance with legal, regulatory and hu-
man rights requirements in the countries in which we operate. Upon le-
arning of any investigations regarding our business operations, Citi works
cooperatively with local authorities. In the United States, Citi works with
the Federal Reserve Board, Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to ensure that we comply with established laws and regu-
lations, including Fair Lending and the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA).
In alignment with Citi’s commitment to ethical standards, and to ex-
ceed increased regulatory obligations and expectations in communities,
our commitment extends deep into how we partner with stakeholders and
support inclusion and economic progress broadly. Thoughtful engage-
ment with our many stakeholders, including acting on their needs and
feedback, is critical to our success. We engage directly with stakeholder
groups, including consumers, governments, advocates, employees and
others, to ensure that we continue to be of service and reﬁne our servi-
ces and programs to meet the needs of the marginalized communities and
support environmental sustainability.
For example, Citi launched its Sustainable Progress strategy in
2015, a measurable commitment to lend, invest, and facilitate $100 bil-
lion in projects that provide environmental solutions, doubling our 2007
commitment to direct $50 billion toward climate-friendly projects – a goal
that Citi met 3 years earlier than expected. Citi continues to engage so-
cially-responsible investors regarding its sustainability performance
and approach to carbon risk.
To model its commitment to social responsibility and equitable tre-
atment of all people, Citi promotes its global diversity and inclusion po-
licies. It has taken public actions to communicate its support for the ex-
tension of civil rights of its LGBT employees in partnership with the Hu-
man Rights Campaign and a host of other organizations working to achie-
ve equity and dignity on behalf of the broader community.
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In partnership with internal business units and the Citi Foundation,
Citi Community Development and Inclusive Finance aim to restore faith
and rebuild Citi’s reputation in communities. Together, these departments
fortify Citi’s on-the-ground, institutional commitment to improve the li-
ves of low-income, often vulnerable communities in cities where we ope-
rate, leveraging business contributions and philanthropic grants programs
to provide greater economic opportunity and enable access to mainstream
ﬁnancial services.
Citi Community Development is a founding member of the Asset Buil-
ding Policy Network (ABPN), a coalition of the U.S.’s leading civil
rights and advocacy organizations committed to improving the econo-
mic security, particularly through policy and advocacy to reduce income
inequality and racial wealth gap, among racial and ethnic minority hou-
seholds in America. In addition, to promote the integration of eligible im-
migrants in the US, Citi is the Founding Corporate Partner of Cities for
Citizenship, a national campaign with the goal of unlocking the econo-
mic asset of attaining citizenship for the nearly 9 million legal permanent
residents in the United States. Since launching alongside the mayors of
New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles, ﬁfteen additional cities and Mia-
mi-Dade County have joined the program.
Most demographic forecasts predict that more than 50 percent of the
world’s inhabitants will reside in major cities by 2030, and the popula-
tion of young people will increase by 100 million globally. As an exam-
ple of Citi’s aim to promote economic progress among young people, the
Citi Foundation in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
launched Accelerating Pathways, the ﬁrst-of-its-kind index that compa-
res the eﬀorts of 35 global cities to contribute to young people’s econo-
mic prospects. The project oﬀers a snapshot of young people’s ambitions
and perceptions of their opportunity as well as factors that contribute to
an enabling economic environment for their success. This eﬀort is an ex-
tension of the Foundation’s Pathways to Progress initiative in the U.S.,
which works to help urban youth build an entrepreneurial mindset, ac-
quire leadership, ﬁnancial and workplace skills, and begin to participa-
te in the formal economy through a ﬁrst job. Policymakers as well as bu-
siness and civic leaders have the opportunity to use the project’s data and
ﬁndings to formulate and strengthen their policies and programs to in-
clude more young people as meaningful contributors to society.
As a global institution with a long-standing history in more than 100
countries, Citi’s initiatives move beyond internal campaigns to include
91
authentic collaborations with community organizations, municipalities,
and nonproﬁts that inﬂuence policies to improve the quality of vulnera-
ble people and better position them with the skills, tools, and resources
to achieve their goals and aspirations.
3. reSPOnSIBLe anD InCLUSIve FInanCe
A culture of ethics for a global ﬁnancial institution includes more than
just a commitment to discourage, prevent and respond to wrongful ac-
tivity – it also includes the drive to conduct business that engages posi-
tively with society and drives tangible, sustainable impact. At Citi, that
commitment comes to life in the leadership role we play in tackling en-
trenched economic, social and environmental challenges facing cities and
communities around the world. As a global bank that operates in some
of the most complex urban environments in the world, we understand
that the strength and vitality of cities depend on core urban ecosystem
needs, such as housing, social services, energy, economic empowerment,
ﬁnancial inclusion and infrastructure. Financial institutions play a criti-
cal role in addressing all of these needs, and Citi is committed to inve-
sting in systemic eﬀorts that enable urban economic progress for people.
Citi Inclusive Finance is a specialist team that works across Citi bu-
sinesses globally to develop solutions that enable the bank, its clients and
partners to expand access to ﬁnancial services and advance economic pro-
gress in underserved communities. Leading more than 150 commercial
partnerships with microﬁnance institutions in 40 countries, the team re-
presents the broadening of Citi’s focus to meet the challenges of aﬀor-
dability, access and resiliency through building a new generation of sca-
lable services, systems and technologies in service of expanding ﬁnan-
cial access and stimulating economic development. Inclusive Finance goes
beyond philanthropy by leveraging cross-sector partnerships and sup-
porting innovative approaches to embed investments that make a social
impact into Citi’s core businesses to the beneﬁt of clients and communities.
Among many achievements, we arranged the ﬁrst capital markets tran-
sactions for microﬁnance institutions in a number of countries. We struc-
tured the ﬁrst investment grade bond for microﬁnance in Mexico with
a partial guarantee from the IFC (FT 2004 deal of the year). As the in-
dustry and our client's needs have expanded, so have the services and pro-
ducts Citi provides. For example, Citi is pioneering aﬀordable and ac-
cessible mobile payments that connect some of the largest companies with
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the smallest producers and distributors. In 2014, Citi Inclusive Finance
partnered with the IDB to launch a $500 million Education, Youth and
Employment (EYE) bond. This ﬁrst-of-its-kind instrument enables investors
to ﬁnance programs across Latin America that support early childhood
care, primary and secondary education, vocational training and job pla-
cement.
Working with the U.S. government’s Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC), Citi’s decade-plus partnership has provided USD$406
million in direct ﬁnancing to 44 microﬁnance institutions in 25 countries
to date, funding more than 1.2 million microbusinesses; of which more
than a million are owned by women. In 2014, Citi created a new $220
million loan framework that will expand access to ﬁnancial services for
micro- and small businesses in our corporate clients’ value chains. Over
the life of the partnership, Citi and OPIC have executed 16 diﬀerent fra-
meworks totaling $2.8 billion in guarantee capacity.
In California, Citi joined with the San Francisco Mayor’s Oﬃce, the
Oﬃce of the Treasurer, the Department of Children, Youth, & Their Fa-
milies and the San Francisco Uniﬁed School District to launch Kindergarten
to College—the ﬁrst publicly-funded, universal children’s college savings
account program in the United States. To date, families have invested more
than $1.5 million of their own money into nearly 22,000 savings accounts,
which are held at Citibank. Some 50% of contributing families qualify
for the National School Lunch Program as they earn less than $40,000
annually for a family of four people. In New York, Citi Inclusive Finan-
ce partnered with Grameen America in 2014 to help provide over
7,000 women entrepreneurs in Harlem, New York, with small business
loans through 2020. Citi oﬀers savings accounts with no service fees to
help women participating in the program build their ﬁnancial identity
and save while Grameen America provides microloans to help grow their
businesses. To date, Citi has opened more than 12,000 savings accounts
for Grameen members.
4. COnCLUSIOn
Every day, Citi strives to meet and exceed our responsibilities to our clients,
shareholders, regulators, communities and global partners through
strong governance, thoughtful and frequent engagement, and by doing
business according to the highest standards of professional and ethical
conduct. At Citi we are absolutely convinced that ethics pays. It is exac-
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tly what we need to do to provide conﬁdence to the marketplace, to our
customers and to our employees, that we are focused on doing the right
thing. We strive to act with integrity and to meet and exceed our re-
sponsibilities in all that we do. When we don’t, we hold ourselves ac-
countable and we expect that our stakeholders will hold us accountable
as well. We understand that nurturing a culture that promotes and lives
up to a high ethical standard of doing business and engaging with society
both strengthens the long-term sustainability of our ﬁnancial institution
and, ultimately, beneﬁts the communities we serve – because without trust,
our company and sector cannot succeed.
Citi’s mission is to serve as a trusted partner to our clients by re-
sponsibly providing financial services that enable growth and eco-
nomic progress. Our core activities are safeguarding assets, len-
ding money, making payments and accessing the capital markets
on behalf of our clients…
… These capabilities create an obligation to act responsibly, do
everything possible to create the best outcomes, and prudently
manage risk. If we fall short, we will take decisive action and le-
arn from our experience.
We strive to earn and maintain the public’s trust by constantly
adhering to the highest ethical standards. We ask our colleagues
to ensure that their decisions pass three tests: they are in our clients'
interests, create economic value, and are always systemically re-
sponsible. When we do these things well, we make a positive fi-
nancial and social impact in the communities we serve and show
what a global bank can do.
Citi’s Mission and Value Proposition.
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The Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation was founded by Saint
John Paul II in 1993 as a forum for businessmen, professionals, econo-
mists and academics that delves into how Christian social teaching can
be applied in real economic life. On behalf of the Foundation and its mem-
bers in 20 countries, I am very honored to have been invited to speak in
this highly acclaimed session of the Rome Investment Forum and I would
like to congratulate the organisers for putting the emphasis on sustainable
and social investment. What do these terms imply?
We urgently need a humanism capable of bringing together the diﬀerent
ﬁelds of knowledge, including economics, in the service of a more inte-
gral and integrating vision writes Pope Francis in Laudato si’ (141). And
his predecessor in Caritas in Veritate: Locating resources, ﬁnancing, pro-
duction, consumption and all the other phases in the economic cycle ine-
vitably have moral implications. Thus every economic decision has a mo-
ral consequence (37).
When talking about investing in sustainable ﬁnance and social in-
frastructure, the starting point is necessarily an integrating concept of
sustainability and social utility, something which is very central to the eco-
nomic and social views of the Catholic Church and also acceptable for
many, whether or not members of the Church.
Investing in sustainable ﬁnance
and social infrastructure
– Public Private Partnerships
DOmInGO SUGranyeS BICKeL*
* Chairman Centesimus Annus pro Pontifice Foundation.
1. new SOCIaL DemanDS OFFer Great OPPOrtUnItIeS
In a way, we are at a lucky point in economic history, in spite of all our
uncertainties: the urgent need to rethink existing patterns in economic
life can and should be seen as opportunities. We need economic growth
to continue ﬁghting poverty, but there is also a 2 demand for qualitati-
ve changes: more sustainable use of resources, more responsible con-
sumption, more opportunities for the young unemployed, better pro-
fessional education, better access to job satisfaction. We are facing a real
demand for a qualitatively diﬀerent economy, and this oﬀers huge op-
portunities for innovation and investment.
Experience shows that relying on centralized and impersonal public pro-
grams does not bring sustainable solutions on either front: qualitative chan-
ge cannot be achieved through regulation alone; and the old assistance
systems can induce a dangerous ‘welfare trap’ based on passivity and inac-
tion which aggravates poverty.
We know that decentralized entrepreneurial initiative is the only con-
text where the new demands can be satisﬁed, while the ﬁght against po-
verty can continue at the same time. If there is demand for more re-
sponsible use of resources and more sustainable products, let’s go for it:
the market economy has given proof of its ability to adapt. The same ap-
plies to demands from workers of all ages for better jobs and more job sa-
tisfaction.
In order to succeed in satisfying the new demands, entrepreneurial ini-
tiative needs a favourable institutional context. Let’s admit: there are big
obstacles on the way: entitlements which prevent the excluded from ac-
cessing jobs; inadequate education systems which lead candidates to unem-
ployment; subsidization which hinders competition, and prevents start-
ups to reach break-even; rigid legislations which hinder innovation. We
have the moral obligation to be self-critical about our own business prac-
tices: too often, we pay lip-service to the market economy while at the
same time defend positions of corporatist privilege.
Who are the movers of this necessary rethinking of economic life? Some
people would say: the unions, the co-operatives, the new social move-
ments… Maybe, but it won’t work unless there is an eﬀective answer in
the form of true economic innovation, which in turn is inseparable from
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entrepreneurial initiative, intelligently supported – though not control-
led – by the State. If there is consensus that environment protection and
job creation are today’s more urgent needs in Europe, then let’s turn to
the forces which really have the 3 resources to change the state of things.
And this means providing adequate education, regulatory support and
available ﬁnance to support the ﬂourishing of a new breed of entrepre-
neurs of the present day.
2. “heLP the POOr heLP themSeLveS”
From our viewpoint of the relatively well-oﬀ, it is preoccupying to see a
growing distance between levels of income. Not so much because of ine-
quality as such – egalitarian utopia don’t usually produce good econo-
mic or democratic results – but because it seems that in relative terms,
and sometimes even in absolute terms, the poor are becoming poorer, even
in our aﬄuent society: the problems of wage stagnation or wage reduc-
tion, precariousness and marginality. Now the refugee emergency in Eu-
rope brings new dimensions to the problem and sometimes can deviate
available resources from previously registered poor people. And the usual
answer is: more tax.
Is additional tax a solution for these problems? Who guarantees that
the new tax revenues would be used for the needs of the poor, when pu-
blic debt and government uncontrolled expense eat such a large part of
public income, and when welfare beneﬁts are still too often spread on peo-
ple who don’t really need them?
In America ﬁrst, but also in Europe, more and more voluntary philan-
thropic action is being undertaken by business. This important deve-
lopment requires speciﬁc attention. Management expertise, transparency
and good governance are great factors of success whereby corporate phi-
lanthropy can signiﬁcantly contribute to social action projects.
On the other hand, business promoted charities need to learn from Church
supported and other charitable movements. Social projects can’t succeed
unless they are based on communities on the recipients’ end getting totally
involved in decision making and motivation, so as to become digniﬁed agents
of their own destiny, using a phrase by Pope Francis in his recent address
to the United Nations. Religious and NGOs have an indispensable know-
how in organising participative, bottom-up initiatives. 4 Be it religious, idea-
97
listic, or corporate, philanthropic initiatives are highly positive, but there
is need for more: more voluntary involvement by corporations and, abo-
ve all, more commitment by people and families in the rich parts of the
world. We need the funds to become larger so as to reach economies of sca-
le. The amount of resources mobilized needs to be signiﬁcantly higher if
we are to change the trend towards impoverishment. The running of the
funds should not only be transparent; their founders should also renounce
corporate or local pride and embark more decidedly on the purpose of the
common good: and this probably requires joining resources in creating com-
mon funds, putting them under independent management and applying
to them generally accepted accountability rules.
A focused action on promoting new, professionnally managed volunta-
ry solidarity funds can be an answer to the danger of increased margi-
nalisation. This is a subject on which the Centesimus Annus pro Ponti-
ﬁce Foundation is now working and we hope to come up with action orien-
ted recommendations in the near future.
3. a rOLe FOr SOLIDarIty In BUSIneSS DeCISIOnS
But what about business itself: is there space for solidarity in business de-
cisions? Investing in Sustainable Finance and Social Infrastructure, our
theme of this morning, implies that business decisions involve a degree
of solidarity, the same way as in every human act, gift and fraternity co-
exist with the natural yearning for individual satisfaction.
Against many situations of mismanagement, corruption and lack of ac-
countability – which are now so frequently exposed to public scrutiny –
we all know that it is also possible to build areas of the market economy
which serve directly the common good. How can we enlarge this bright
side of the economy? Let me just indicate a few practical possibilities:
1. Promoting a culture of service to society in our organizations is so-
mething where we all can invest. Putting organizations to the servi-
ce of common good is in the ﬁrst place a cultural fact which in the best
cases permeates all policies, 5 from product design to the use of re-
sources, from sales policies to personnel management and ﬁnancial
plans. Why not expressly change our order of priorities, not as a mar-
keting tool, but as a potent management resource?
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2. To foster these ideas, we need to promote intermediate bodies which
autonomously sustain solidarity and contribute to harmonize concepts
and interests that would otherwise be in conﬂict. It is not just Public
Private Partnership, as in the title of the present session. The idea is
to look for opportunities of developing civil society, i.e. initiatives which
are really developed in common between diﬀerent groups and or-
ganisations; for example, social development projects jointly supported
by business, associations and public bodies.
3. Linking entitlements with duties allows to build co-responsibility at
corporate level and in all possible “alliances for change”. One of the
diﬃcult pre-conditions here is to return to more proportionate levels
of rewards between diﬀerent levels of responsbility, i.e. reducing ex-
cessively high salaries and bonuses. This is not totally unrealistic: Let
me just quote John Cryan, Deutsche Bank new co-CEO in a recent spe-
ech in Frankfurt: “Bonuses don’t make bankers work harder… Pay in
the sector is still too high, and I don’t fully empathise with people who
say they turn up to work and work harder because they can be paid
a little bit more” (FT, nov 25, 2015).
4. Corporations and small business ﬁrms are all indispensable partners
of professional training and transitional monitoring, which works very
well in some European countries, but is totally unsatisfactory in others.
If we are able to communicate these kind of ideas and take the right ac-
tion in our own professional environment, a favourable climate will na-
turally emerge for investment in sustainable ﬁnance and social infra-
structure.
Public-private partnership is not an easy path, unless it is seen in such
an integrating framework of corporate culture and active civil society. Why
is it diﬃcult? Because we have had so many bad examples of politically
inﬂuenced mismanagement in ﬁnance, in real estate 6 development, in
construction and in many more areas of business. On the contrary, long
term, sustainable business continuity and success are made of autono-
mous investment decisions and marketing policies, not on relying on Sta-
te subsidies or concessions. So a word of caution is necessary about pu-
blic-private partnership: it might be necessary in the broader context of
“alliances for change”, but it can work only if all parties are inspired by
a vocation of public service, under a strict regime of transparency, well
known rules of the game, and total accountability.
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4. FInanCe wIth a PUrPOSe
Sustainable ﬁnance requires a chapter of its own. In the present context
of profound changes in the ﬁnancial sector, both through added regulation
and through internally promoted ethical displicine, there is an urgent need
for the reforms to be instilled with real ethical and human perspective.
Financial institutions need to redeﬁne their business model in the new
context, which probably implies more moderate return targets, a shift to-
wards long term incentives and bonus policies at all levels, and zero to-
lerance of unethical practice which should always be punitively expen-
sive for those involved. The added regulatory constraints and market de-
mands are in any case forcing the institutions to pay even more attention
to consumer protection, to family ﬁnancial education and to avoid excessive
leveraging.
Perhaps in addition to all this, the deepest challenge is to rediscover ﬁ-
nance with a purpose: helping job creation through decentralized len-
ding at the level of small ﬁrms and local initiative; mobilize ﬁnancial te-
chnology for inclusive ﬁnance through the use of mobile devices and di-
gitization: these are just some of the objectives which the best ﬁnancial
institutions are already adopting among their basic policy aims and this
is probably the way towards real ﬁnancial reform.
To conclude: thank you for opening your debate to the theme of this es-
sential rethinking of economic life. In the eyes of the Centesimus Annus
pro Pontiﬁce Foundation these questions and challenges do not limit the
possibilities of future growth. On the contrary, they are the key which mo-
tivates us to look forward and design a future which considers deep chan-
ges in both purpose and practice in ﬁnance, enterprise and the economy.
These are ideas which contribute in the continous exercise to identify the
best investment opportunities towards Financing Long-Term Europe.
1. IntrODUCtIOn
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, and beyond, a new awareness has emer-
ged on the importance of ethics in ﬁnance. Speciﬁc and highly publici-
sed cases of fraud and ethical misconduct have profoundly damaged the
reputation of the ﬁnancial sector. Moreover, the perception has gained
traction that widespread opportunism and sloppy integrity standards en-
courage reckless risk taking and corrupt the overall business climate in
the ﬁnancial world. The outcome has been loss of conﬁdence and poor
public trust in ﬁnance, which in turn has undermined business oppor-
tunities, alienated the sympathy of policy makers and the public opinion.
Ultimately this state of aﬀair widened the gap between potential and ac-
tual ﬁnancial activity in terms for instance of intermediation of savings,
bank deposits, insurance penetration, and investment opportunities.
The industry response however has been robust energetic and with
encouraging results. Ethical reconstruction is ﬁguring prominently in bu-
siness strategies and communication campaigns. Moreover, it appears
“internally-driven”, i.e. originating from and building upon the business
plans of the ﬁnancial players themselves. Robert Annibale’s paper, of Ci-
tigroup Internally-Driven Ethical Reconstruction: is It Happening? –
which I would like to comment upon – provides a clear illustration of the
level of commitment and the variety of tools and programs that the lea-
ding enterprises in the trade have devoted to rebuilding trust, stren-
gthening reputation and showing responsiveness to clients’ needs and
communities’ welfare. The paper is highly informative and draws on con-
crete examples of corporate engagement in ethical reconstruction, ai-
med at consolidating public conﬁdence and the credibility of the ﬁnancial
industry.
Micro- and Macro- approaches
to ethical recapitalization of the ﬁnancial sector
PaOLO GarOnna
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The questions we may wish to ask in relation to these actions and ef-
forts are the following: a) Do these eﬀorts match requirements?; b) Are
they enough, and/or necessary?; c) Do they achieve expected goals and
outcomes?
In the Dublin Memorandum, issued by the Centesimus Annus Pro Pon-
tiﬁce Foundation in 2014, it is rightly stated that “to build ethics into ﬁ-
nance, the proper place to begin is the corporation…”. Annibale’s paper
provides a convincing case in support of this statement, showing how the
market itself stimulates innovation and social engagement driven by a
highly competitive environment. “But – the Memorandum adds – these
eﬀorts should combine” with eﬀorts at diﬀerent levels, i.e. the private with
the public, the micro- with the macro- etc.
This “combination” however is not a trivial aﬀair, does not come by
itself. It is in the blending of eﬀorts from individual enterprises, gover-
nment policies, regulators, business and industrial leaders and civil so-
ciety organizations that lies the secret of success. Furthermore, in mo-
ving from the perspective of the individual corporation to that of socie-
ty as a whole, there may occur a “fallacy of composition” – as economists
call it. In other terms, it may happen that what is optimal from the stan-
dpoint of the individual corporation may not be optimal from the per-
spective of the economy and society as a whole. A well-known example
to illustrate this concept is in the combination of a micro-prudential with
a macro-prudential approach. From the perspective of an individual en-
terprise, and an individual regulator, increasing the number and the per-
vasiveness of controls and regulations should lead to greater safety and
stability. But if the burden of rules and checks is increased for the who-
le industry, particularly following a countercyclical pattern, the impact
on risk taking and the balance sheet of the sector may become negative
and have a devastating eﬀect, leading therefore not to more, but rather
less stability and safety. Does this concept apply also to ethical rebuilding?
I will proceed as follows:
- First I will establish a few conceptual foundations, reviewing the no-
tion of ethical capital, and linking it with uncertainty and solidari-
ty.
- Second I will make reference to the global risk scenario and the chal-
lenges the ﬁnancial sector has to address to rebuild public trust.
- I will then review the lessons learned at the corporate level and the
best practise, drawing basically on the Citygroup experience.
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- I will deal then with the issue of bridging the proﬁtability gap through
ethical investment, as an illustration of a possible fallacy of compo-
sition.
- Finally I will draw conclusions, focusing on the need for a global stra-
tegy, the importance of an industry-level dimension, and on putting
“ﬁnance for the poor” at the top of the agenda.
I have been inspired and guided throughout by the Catholic social and
economic thinking, and in particular, by the encyclical Caritas in Veritate,
which shifts the focus from the “ethical limits” of ﬁnance to its “ethical
foundations”. In so doing, it gives a further and more profound meaning
to the “internally-driven” ethical reconstruction:
Efforts are needed – and it is essential to say this – not only to crea-
te “ethical” sectors or segments of the economy or the world of finance,
but to ensure that the whole economy – the whole of finance – is ethi-
cal, not merely by virtue of an external label, but by its respect for
requirements intrinsic to its very nature.
(Caritas in Veritate, par. 45)
2. COnCePtUaL FOUnDatIOnS: trUSt, UnCertaInty anD SOLIDarIty
In the economic literature, the notion of trust as capital is a fairly recent
acquisition, and presents still several elusive features (Acs 2015, Bull et
alii 2010, also Shandwick, Spickard). I cannot in this paper dwell much
on such features, but wish only to highlight a few elements of the fra-
mework that are required by the arguments developed in the paper.
a) Trust is an economic factor of production (social capital).
b) Trust was undoubtedly hit by the crisis of 2007-2013, but it has been
eroded well before the crisis, and will not recover therefore auto-
matically after the crisis. In other terms, there are both “cycles” of trust,
and long-term “trends” of trust.
c) Trust is not a raw material, but a renewable source of capital. In other
terms, it is both an input, and an output. Therefore, it can – and should
– be produced and accumulated through investment and dedicated
resources.
d) Lack of trust is inherently linked to uncertainty (F.Knight). Enhan-
cing public trust implies creating a social order through (formal and
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informal) rules, but also values and ethics. Norms guide behaviour
and make it predictable and meaningful. Ethical capital therefore is
part of social capital, a fundamental part of it.
e) Trust is inherently linked to love. Solidarity and social cohesion crea-
te an environment that stimulates public trust (see Nussbaum
2013). Even when and where one is confronted with the mysteries
of life and the universe, we need not fall prey of fear and anguish. Ge-
nerosity and the reasons of the heart, supported by faith, should come
to rescue leading to trust (emotional capital). On this fundamental
link, Catholic thinking has provided in my view its more speciﬁc and
unique contribution (in Laudato si’, there is a whole section on “Ci-
vic and political love”). “Social love is the way to authentic deve-
lopment” (Laudato si’, par. 228).
In sum, ethical reconstruction should be seen as a very complex compre-
hensive and resource-intensive endeavour. It belongs to the “core” inve-
stment strategies of an economy, or an enterprise, more than to its “external”
relations and communications campaign. It must start then from an in-depth
understanding of the sources of fear and insecurity that are at the root of
public mistrust; and strive to ﬁll the gaps as much as possible with infor-
mation knowledge and wisdom. Finally, it requires the commitment and
engagement that match the challenges to address, i.e. the deployment of
a strong sense of responsibility, solidarity and moral leadership.
3. the PrevaILInG UnCertaInty OF the GLOBaL rISK SCenarIO
We live in a world of unprecedented uncertainty. Daunting challenges con-
front us: terrorism and conﬂicts, massive waves of refugees and migrants,
population aging and climate change, growing inequalities and social frac-
tures, etc. The paradox is that the same forces that create new promises
of prosperity and social progress are also at the root of disequilibrium and
insecurity. Unprecedented longevity, globalisation, technological chan-
ge, growing mobility, undeniable progress in education and in ﬁghting
poverty illness and hunger, new peoples and players emerging in the glo-
bal economy: all factors that should open the way to a better future, but
that feed instead anxiety and fear. The fact is that we have not been able
to manage and steer the push towards change in a way that enables it to
bring about its full potential beneﬁt, and at the same time minimizes its
costs and negative implications. The ordinary citizens therefore have rea-
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sons to be concerned. Inadequate global governance, economic and ﬁ-
nancial instability, growing deprivation and social vulnerability, the slow-
down in output and productivity growth, the frightening solitude and alie-
nation of many new urban landscapes.
These are only a few examples of the many problems that we have
been unable to understand and address eﬀectively, and that have led to
crisis after crisis. Actually, among the many competing interpretations
of the Great Crisis, the one I consider the most encompassing and con-
vincing is the following: before the crisis, we were overconﬁdent of our
ability to cope with the global risk scenario, but then in the depths of the
crisis we discovered that there are many thinks we do not know, e.g. about
systemic interdependence or market clearing or democratic governan-
ce, and our institutional mechanisms proved inadequate to cope with the
challenges. As we recover from the crisis, we are getting a better under-
standing of how the economy, ﬁnance and policies interact, and we are
adopting the necessary institutional reforms.
Rebuilding trust implies coming to terms with this big and global pic-
ture. It is the ﬁrst building block of ethical reconstruction. And it is huge.
4. FInanCIaL DeveLOPment:
mOre SOLUtIOn than CaUSe OF the PrOBLem
This line of reasoning helps explaining why the ﬁnancial sector appears
more exposed to the threat of mistrust than other sectors. It is not sim-
ply that the crisis started in ﬁnance, that there were more fraud and scan-
dals there, or that ﬁnancial ﬁrms were not suﬃciently aware and did not
invest in it. The real reason is that ﬁnance deals with risk and uncertainty,
is more reliant on trust than other business sectors, and requires there-
fore higher levels of integrity, human capital and education.
It is not surprising therefore to see that in the post crisis recovery ﬁnancial
development has come to be considered as a major driver of growth. Financial
development and innovation is needed to channel funds towards infra-
structure and SMEs, relaunch investment, provide new forms of protection
vis-à-vis old age or climate change, support technical change and start-ups.
Finance is called upon to bring uncertainty under control by identifying mea-
suring and managing risks. This requires a leap forward in knowledge and
leadership. It is not “irrational exuberance” or “depression” that drives the
ups and downs of ﬁnancial markets, but rather their real and legitimate con-
cern over our ability to understand and manage the challenges ahead.
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A proof a contrario is in the success of the “whatever it takes” appro-
ach that the ECB has been using in steering monetary policy against de-
ﬂation and instability. Markets regain conﬁdence when they see that lea-
ders are on top of things, and do not shy away from taking responsibili-
ty. If we had similar statements coming for instance from the European
Council or the G20, in relation to the Syrian conﬂict or the migration tsu-
nami, among others, the impact on public conﬁdence would be formidable.
5. BUILD ethICS FrOm BeLOw: LeSSOnS FrOm the COrPOrate SeCtOr
Individual ﬁrms, i.e. banks, insurance companies, pension funds, stock-
brokers, ﬁnancial advisors, etc., have been at the forefront of the battle
for regaining the conﬁdence of savers and the public. Corporate social
responsibility, responsible investment, sustainable insurance and social
impact investment have become new competitive tools in an increasin-
gly competitive market. Competition has stimulated the dissemination
of best practise and pushed operators towards investing more and bet-
ter in business ethics. Branding has come into play as a tool for stren-
gthening the image of social responsibility and the corporate identity of
the ﬁrm as a caring institution.
Regulators have plaid a fundamental role particularly in the ﬁeld of
corporate governance, compliance, auditing and risk management. Ho-
wever, more than top down prescriptions, what is driving change is the
pervasive contagion of best practise and leading by examples.
Internal “codes of conduct”, particularly when built with employee-
management cooperation, have been eﬀective in producing ownership
of the philosophy of good behaviour and an entrenched culture of inte-
grity. They have to be monitored and supported by training, incentives
and recognition mechanisms. A focus on “substantive compliance” is nee-
ded, capable of going well beyond the formal rules and the avoidance of
legislative sanctions. People should feel responsibility for striving for the
highest standards of integrity and business ethics.
The question of compensation particularly that of the top manage-
ment has attracted a lot of attention, sometimes driven by populist cam-
paigns. The issue however cannot be dismissed with a purely defensive
response. It is true that adopting the “market rates” of remuneration and
avoiding intrusive legislation is necessary to attract the best human ca-
pital and encourage “meritocracy”. But responsibility should be exerci-
sed and excesses avoided.
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In order to build ethics from below, the power of good examples and
sound leadership is fundamental. Here lies one of the great strengths of
the Catholic world and of the teaching of the Church. There is a great tra-
dition, a tradition that is ancient prestigious and spread out all over the
world, a tradition nurtured by exemplary cases of excellent work, like e.g.
the cooperative movement or the Catholic missions in the developing coun-
tries.
Not enough in my view has been done so far for collecting analysing
and making available the wide and growing experience of good practi-
se in the ﬁeld of responsible investment and sustainable ﬁnance. It is a
question of information, data, case studies, but also of indicators, ana-
lytical and benchmarking tools. We need to better understand how ethi-
cal capital works, what motivates to invest in ethical capital, what are the
obstacles and the constraints, what the returns, the impact and the out-
comes.
A fully-ﬂedged monitoring mechanism producing on a continuing and
regular basis evidence, studies and policy analysis would be highly be-
neﬁcial. Experience has to be gathered accumulated exchanged and com-
pared, and a better assessment of progress made, or lack thereof,
should be made.
6. FrOm mICrO- tO maCrO- ethICaL reCOnStrUCtIOn:
the qUeStIOn OF PrOFItaBILIty
If one considers an individual case of corporate ethical reconstruction, one
may think it implies less focus on proﬁtability. To reinforce ethical stan-
dards and behaviour at the ﬁrm level is not a free lunch. It involves con-
siderable resources. In short, “ethics costs”! The question then is: “Does
ethics pay”? or better “Should ethics always pay?”. In Annibale’s paper, we
ﬁnd a strong statement on this point: “At Citi we are absolutely convinced
that ethics pays”. Perhaps we should qualify: even though this may not hap-
pen necessarily in all cases, in the short term, nor always, it is true that in
the long term, and looking at the generality of the cases, ethics pays. It is un-
deniable in fact that many of the channels through which an increase in
conﬁdence generates returns that more than oﬀset the increase in costs,
do not necessarily operate at the level of an individual company, and in
the short term. There are externalities, both negative (because a fraud in
one ﬁrm reverberates negatively on the whole industry) and positive (be-
cause a case of excellence beneﬁts widely the reputation of the sector).
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The relationship between ethics and proﬁtability therefore should be
analysed more in depth. If we look at the return on equity (ROE) of Euro
area banks in the last two decades (Graph 1), we see clearly a sharp fall
between 2007 and 2009 that corresponds with the period of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis and the loss of trust that it entailed. But even before the crisis,
and afterwards, the pattern follows a declining trend suggesting that also
other factors were at play. Splitting revenues and costs (see Graph 2), we
observe that revenues have been on a declining trend throughout the pe-
riod, and the drop in costs has accelerated after the inception of the cri-
sis, probably in an attempt at sustaining proﬁtability and recovering the
erosion of margins.
At the industry level, the question of falling proﬁtability has been, and
is of great concern and has been greatly debated and analysed. The squee-
ze on margins has been attributed to the low interest rates environment,
growing competition, and mounting cost pressures. Sluggish demand has
also plaid a role and it is likely that consumer and investor conﬁdence has
negatively aﬀected demand. However, we are still far from clearly un-
derstanding to what extent and how ethical investment, by restoring pu-
blic conﬁdence and improving customer relations, can have an impact on
proﬁtability and invert the declining trend.
I believe that the greatest obstacle to bridging the proﬁtability gaps
has be found in the huge ﬁnancial output gap that prevents the sector from
developing at its full potential. Even in the most advanced market eco-
nomies, we are facing less than optimal levels of banking, low insuran-
ce penetration, and insuﬃcient development of capital markets. The gap
obviously is much greater in emerging and developing economies. Let us
consider for instance the possibility for increasing pension savings and
health insurance. Or the need to ﬁnd new ways of ﬁnancing infrastruc-
ture and SMEs. Or the obstacles that prevent access to equity for start-
ups and young innovators. The emerging new forms of welfare, the gro-
wing reliance on public private partnerships to ﬁnance investment, the
new ﬁnancial instruments for funding small ﬁrms (e.g. minibonds) and
social infrastructures, show the potential for enlarging ﬁnancial markets
and making them more proﬁtable, and more able to contribute to the com-
mon good. Progress in these endeavours is often linked to advances in
knowledge and/or education. On both of them, ethics has a bearing, sin-
ce public trust is required for ﬁghting uncertainty and promoting solidarity.
It is clear in any case that a fallacy of composition may be operating
here. What in fact may take place at the level of an individual corporation
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– that might have to sacriﬁce in the name of ethics short term proﬁts to
re-establish its reputation in the market –, does not apply to the entire mar-
ket. For the economy as a whole, indeed “ethics pays”, or at least it should
pay! And if it does not, this means that our eﬀorts are not enough, are not
well calibrated and coordinated, and therefore are not eﬀective.
7. COnCLUSIOn: tOwarDS a GLOBaL StrateGy,
mICrO- maCrO- anD meSO-
In commenting on the excellent paper by Robert Annibale, which reﬂects
the leading experience at Citi Bank, I underlined how important are the
initiatives developed at the grass-root level by individual players in the
ﬁnancial sector, and more broadly in the business sector and in society.
The Dublin Memorandum of the FCCPP pointed out that “to build ethics
into ﬁnance, the proper place to begin is the corporation”. There is a gro-
wing body of evidence to substantiate this statement, and much more could
be learned if evidence were systematically collected, analysed and dis-
seminated through some monitoring mechanism, which we propose to
put in place. Starting from the experience in the Catholic world that should
be at the forefront of providing, not only bold thinking, but also, and more
importantly practical and concrete examples of good practise and suc-
cess stories.
However, the Dublin Memorandum rightly adds that “these eﬀorts
should combine” with eﬀorts at diﬀerent levels, the whole of the priva-
te sector and the public sector, the stakeholders and civil society. We be-
lieve that it is in this “combination” of diﬀerent initiatives, from regula-
tion to government policies, from business strategies to consumers groups,
from opinion leaders to academics etc., that lies the secret of success. We
need in other terms an overall “global strategy”, comprehensive of all the
relevant players, including many diﬀerent tools and levels, widely sha-
red and consistently supported, a collective and concerted eﬀort within
a partnership approach.
In linking the corporate level with the community level, the ﬁnancial
sector can play a critical role that is often neglected. In other terms, bet-
ween the micro-level and the macro-, a meso-level can be quite important.
The ﬁnance industry as a whole can and should be perceived as a key pla-
yer for the common good. A lot can be achieved by the collective eﬀorts
of banks insurance companies and funds, without necessarily having re-
course to public policies and taxpayers’ money. The subsidiarity princi-
110
ple should be applied here. Leading players in the industry, particularly
big corporations, should not only lead in their corporation providing con-
crete examples of good practise, but they should also exercise leadership
in the industry working with other players, especially the smaller ones,
in disseminating good practises and encouraging engagement and ad-
vancement. In other terms, in the ﬁnancial sector there should be not only
competition, but also cooperation on cross cutting issues, like that of ethics.
A lot remains to be done to convince the public that ﬁnancial deve-
lopment brings about beneﬁt not only to the ﬁrms in the sector but also
to the economy as a whole. Showing that a successful model of sustai-
nable development should be ﬁnance-driven remains by-and-large still
an unaccomplished task (see for an example a contrario the report “Whe-
re next Europe” by the City of London Corp.). The many ways through
which ﬁnancial development can contribute to the common good
should be more clearly spelled out and communicated to the public.
8. FOCUS On FInanCe FOr the POOr
On the issue of ﬁnancial inclusion signiﬁcant steps forward have been made
from the Maya Declaration (2011) to the G20 White Paper on “Global Stan-
dard Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion” (GPFI White Paper 2015).
- First awareness of the importance of the issue has increased at the
level of Governments, international organisations (OECD, World Bank,
the Basel Committee etc.) and stakeholders’ groups.
Second, we have acquired a better understanding of the risks and be-
neﬁts of regulation in relation to the goals of promoting the partici-
pation of the underprivileged and the underserved in the ﬁnancial
activities. Regulators and standard setting bodies have been at the
forefront of this monitoring exercise.
- Third, the analysis of the risks of exclusion has led to several important
developments and innovation in the normative framework. For in-
stance, the principle of proportionality and the SME supporting fac-
tor have been introduced and supported, due to the concern that an
excessive regulatory burden on the weak and small enterprises would
have undesirable and unintended negative consequences. A similar
preoccupation in relation to underbanked and underprivileged savers
and/or investors has led to a focus on inclusive consumer protection.
De-risking is another item that has attracted attention, whenever ﬁ-
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nancial intermediaries in response to the tightening of prudential
norms engage in large-scale termination or restriction of business li-
nes and relationships, aﬀecting poor communities and developing
countries.
- The impact of ICT and the very promising prospects of Digital Financial
Inclusion have been analysed, particularly the growing role that crowd-
funding could play.
- At the practical level interesting and turbulent transformations are
taking place at the crossroad of ﬁnancial innovation and new ap-
proaches to ﬁnancing of social impact investment. New tools, new ac-
tors, new organisations are challenging traditional ways of providing
support from philanthropy to public services. For a survey, see Salamon
2014.
In spite of these undeniable and signiﬁcant improvements, the topic re-
mains by-and-large underexplored from the analytical point of view, com-
mitment is lacking and ﬁnancial inclusion appears to be the “Cinderel-
la” of public policy in the ﬁnancial sector. This conclusion is endorsed by
the White Paper of the G20 on the topic: “progress on mainstreaming ﬁ-
nancial inclusion in Standard-Setting Bodies standards and guidance is not
enough (…) progress on implementation must also be assessed” (GPFI Whi-
te Paper, 2015).
It is undoubted that a leap forward is required in ﬁnancial inclusion
goals and programs. The issue should be put at the top of business stra-
tegies and of the policy agenda. Eﬀorts should be made at all levels and
from all quarters to give prominence to this objective, and show concrete
results. The credibility of our intentions and plans in consolidating ethics
in ﬁnance is at stake. Financial development should beneﬁt not only banks
and the other ﬁnancial intermediaries, but above all the “real economy”
in terms of economic growth and jobs, and especially the most vulnera-
ble segments of the social and economic fabric.
The poor are to be put at the centre of the world of ﬁnance.
There is little in the way of clear awareness of problems which espe-
cially affect the excluded. Yet they are the majority of the planet’s po-
pulation, billions of people. (…) We have to realize that a true eco-
logical approach always becomes a social approach (…) so as to hear
both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor.
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Source Indicator: World Bank.
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